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Abstract 
The aim of this diploma thesis is to examine the effectiveness of various valuation methods 
when they are applied to public-traded shipping companies, to present their strengths and 
their flews and discuss different behavior aspects that each method might show. In 
particular, the3 methods are examined on the way they behave when applied into 
companies that operate on the most volatile markets of maritime, the wet market and the 
dry market. These two markets saw significant growth the last 15 years due to the extensive 
growth in international trade and the emerging national economies that developed lately. 
In contrast to other markets where the access is considered difficult the access to wet and 
dry market is relatively easy, which has allowed many “players” to give it a try and take a 
piece of the market. Going public has really been a blessing for shipping companies as it 
offers them the opportunity to access cheap funding, they are, however, under surveillance 
by investors and creditors as they compete against other companies. Evaluation methods 
are used by investors and creditors to monitor companies’ performance and financial 
health, but the diversity of the market prohibits the existence of reliable results and, 
furthermore, due to the volatile environment, they cannot be sure about future 
performances and results. The main objective of our research has been the use of valuation 
methods on shipping companies and then the comparison of the results obtained with the 
view that public companies have on these companies for the same period.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Intro to basic valuation methods  
 
As business world has expanded significantly the last 30 years, new methods of valuation 
have been created in order to closely observe and evaluate businesses from different 
scopes. Starting from mid 40s, managers, investors, creditors and other financial markets 
participants have created numerous methods to observe the performance of a company. As 
the years went by, economists and analysts enriched the traditional models with new 
concepts and ideas about the techniques that can determine a fair value for a company or 
indicate if a performance has been efficient or not. The majority of the models represented 
special versions of the traditional method of Net Present Value (NPV) as from the 
beginning it was considered the best method at depicting the cash flow that could be 
generated by a company.  
Of course, the structure of each valuation method that was invented was different, but it 
could be modified depending on the special conditions that are met in each case. For 
example, a model that gives reliable results for manufacturing industry might not behave 
well it is used for evaluating service companies. This phenomenon has to do with different 
cash flows that companies from different business areas have as well as different nature of 
operations. In our research, for example, we evaluate companies that operate in the 
shipping market which is characterized by many fluctuations in the freight rates and, as a 
result, in the income that companies report each year. Another issue has to do with the 
nature of operations and time that a project demands in order to return revenues. In some 
industries an investment made by a company might produce cash flows in a relatively 
shorter period of time than it might happen in another industry. An information technology 
company, for instance, can generate cash flows from an investment faster than a maritime 
or an oil & gas company. That happens because the former company can invest in a project 
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or innovation that can generate multiple cash flows when it goes out on the market. On the 
other hand, a shipping or an oil & gas company has to invest a huge amount of money in a 
project, such as a newbuilding project or  an oil rig, there will be, however, a much longer 
period of time before the project generate revenues, and even then there will be need for 
more time before the investment becomes profitable, because the initial amount invested 
as well as the operating costs are significantly higher while the revenues fluctuate 
according to the demand and the supply in the market. 
Last but not least, it is important to point out that each company, even those of the same 
industry, operates under different legislation, which might affects some operation and 
regular cash flows such as interest taxes. That depends on the legislation of the country that 
the company has been incorporated in. Since many companies are multinational and have 
operational sectors in more than one countries, it is important to estimate the potential cash 
flows according to the country of operation, which makes the overall method of calculation 
more complicated as many more parameters must be taken into consideration.  
The aforementioned has led to many different valuation techniques each of which has 
numerous adjustments for different cases. Of course, more methods were created that are 
not based the idea of discounted cash flow because it came a time when it became obvious 
that investors should not rely only on the expected cash flows but on the overall financial 
position of the firm. For instance, when companies with very different balance sheets 
generate similar cash flows, one firm is more efficient if it has lower value of assets or 
lower outstanding debt. For this reason methods such as “comparables approach”, which 
considers more measures and features of a company than a simple DCF valuation.  
At a point the use of many valuation models serves no purpose in the whole process. That 
has been argued by many economists and professionals. For this reason, after the rapid 
expansion of the valuation techniques, many economists claimed that “a good valuation 
model is simple and helps the investors to make informed decisions” (Viebig, “Equity 
Valuation”, Wiley Finance Series). A good model has to be simple, with some adjustments 
where required but also with simplifying assumptions that would enable the analyst to 
focus on specific valuating aspects and neglect other aspects. Different industries, different 
macroeconomic estimations, different growth rates among markets and companies, public 
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and private companies create a complicated environment that demands such adjustments 
and simplifications where and when it is possible. 
 
1.2 Equity Markets and Valuation methods 
 
Capital Markets played a key role in the expansion of the business world as they became 
the ultimate help for businesses to find what they want more, funding. New companies, or 
even established companies that want to expand their operations or to make some 
additional investments, managed to find funding in equity markets with lower cost than 
they would find from other sources. Of course, equity markets offer not only favorable 
terms but there are always some additional regulations that all listed companies have tο 
comply with. The most important of them is, of course, the exchange of part of ownership 
of the company for an amount of money. Companies raise money from equity markets in 
two ways. The first one is the initial public offering (IPO) that occurs when a company is 
going public and is listed in an equity market for the first time and the second is a second 
issuance of new shares. Of course, the existence of these markets raised significantly the 
competition between the companies that are already publicly-traded and those that would 
like go public. This phenomenon led to invention of new valuation methods that are 
structured in such way that they consider the fact that these companies are public and 
therefore have many owner-investors who can easily change their positions and invest in 
other companies compete with other public companies as well as the fact that these 
companies compete with each other.  
When reaching a point when valuation analysts have to choose one method to use, they 
usually decide among 6 main groups (Fernandez, 2007): 
 Balance sheet-based methods 
 Income-statement-based methods\ 
 Mixed methods 
 Cash flow discounting-based methods 
 Value creation methods 
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 Option methods 
 
The 5 first categories have become the more popular during the last years, because they are 
easier to be implemented and they usually return results that have been proven to reliable. 
Although nowadays there have been created numerous complicated and detailed methods  
that entail many different features of a company, discounted cash flow methods and similar 
methods that are based on them are still the most popular .  
The squeeze in the exchanges has contributed to another phenomenon, too. The 
competition among companies, public and private, has become tougher. As a result, the 
companies has to be very efficient in order to avoid bankruptcy. Many companies cannot 
compete with other companies that operate in the same business area and get financially 
distressed before file for bankruptcy sometimes. Companies going bankrupt is not 
necessarily a bad thing it should not be considered as one. It is rather a form of our legal 
system, that protects companies and, in case of public-traded companies, allows new 
companies, which are in better financial situation, to take their place. In this way, growth 
is boosted in the industry as the new company will have the necessary funds to invest more 
and produce more. For this situation there was a new category of valuation of methods 
created. This was the category of models whose purpose is not to estimate a fair value but 
to predict, if possible, which companies would be financially distressed the following years 
according to the balance sheet and the income statement observed at the time. These 
models’ main purpose is to rank the companies studied according to data provided within 
the balance sheet and the income statement. The most popular model of this kind has been 
the Z – Score model that was created and published in 1968 by Edward I. Altman, a 
Professor of Finance at New York University. Even this model, however, in its original 
version, was suitable for a particular business area. In order to use it in other business areas 
or for other type of companies (public or private) some adjustments are necessary.  
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1.3 Scope of the diploma thesis 
 
This project aims at analyzing 3 methods of valuation that were used to evaluate the 
performance of public shipping companies during periods of collapse in the markets. In 
this way, we try to find out how the methods we chose behave in situations of high 
fluctuations in the market and if the companies with positive valuation before the collapse 
can sustain the positive results even after the collapse of freight rates. The three valuations 
methods that we chose to use are not very popular. We chose these methods because we 
thought that it would be more interesting to implement some non-traditional methods of 
valuation in public shipping companies than implementing the traditional methods. The 
three methods that we implemented are: 
 Economic Value Added (EVA) 
 Altman Z – score 
 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 
In the 2nd chapter there is a brief description of the companies we chose for our research 
and of the shipping markets. The 3rd, 4th and 5th chapter provide extensive description of 
the 3 valuation methods we used, EVA, Z – score and DEA respectively, while in the 6th 
chapter there is extensive presentation of the results obtained as well as brief statistical 
analysis where it is essential. At the end of the 6th chapter, there is a brief review on the 
methods used according to the results generated by each method. Finally, the 7th chapter 
summarizes the conclusions of the diploma thesis and suggest potential research ideas for 
the future. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THESIS BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Intro to Shipping Industry 
 
Shipping is a global industry with prospects closely tied to international trade activity and 
subsequently to the economic activity around the world. The reason maritime is closely 
related to international trade is mainly the fact that it is the most cost-effective mean of 
transporting large volumes of basic commodities and finished products. Considering the 
long distances and the amount of products transported, shipping industry can offer the 
cheapest transportation per ton transported since any other mean of transportation would 
demand much more time for long distances as well as the cost would be prohibiting. 
Moreover, during the last 30 years due to growth of the global economy and globalization, 
the international trade saw unprecedented growth. This growth, of course, resulted in a new 
modern “shipping environment” which was more dynamic and competitive than ever 
before.   
The substantial economic growth led to substantial changes in the shipping market such as 
enormous increase in freight rates, which made clear that market began to take a new form 
as more and more companies appeared to operate in this business area and investments saw 
a boost as well. The increased demand for transportation capacity led to more and bigger 
ships, while the accidents that took place rose the awareness for safety leading to new 
regulations that demanded improved technologies and operational practices, which most 
of times increase the operational expenditures.   
The next three charts illustrate clearly how the world trade rose significantly after 1990 
and how the size of the world fleet adjusted to the new requirements. All the data was found 
in the official site of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(http://unctadstat.unctad.org/) and in the relevant reports provided in this site.
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The first chart illustrates how the global economic growth contributed to a substantial 
increase in the seaborne trade after the 80’s. In more detail, the seaborne trade saw an 
unprecedented growth after the early 90’s as it jumped from nearly 4 billion tons per year 
to 6 billion tons in 2000 and it surpassed the 10 billion tons in 2015. As it is obvious the 
most significant reason for this rise is the increase in dry cargo transported. On the other 
hand, crude oil and the petroleum products increased slightly during this period.   
Chart 2 depicts how the dry cargo trade dominated and change the scene in maritime 
business. While in 1980 the bulk carriers fleet accounted for less than 30% of the world 
fleet and the tankers for almost 50%, the following years the scene changed significantly 
and they both had a percentage of about 45% for many years, until 2010, when the 
demolition of a considerable number of tankers and the delivery of many bulk carriers 
contributed to a new scene in the global shipping business. Specifically, the bulk carrier’s 
share reached 43% in 2015 while the share of tankers the same year fell under 30%. Of 
course, an impressive increase of its share saw the containership fleet, as it jumped from 
2% in 1980 to almost 14% in 2015.  
In this project we try to explore the two biggest sectors of global shipping. That is the dry 
bulk market and the oil market. Chart 3 illustrates the rise in the total fleet the last 35 years 
as well as the increase in the deadweight of dry bulk carriers and of oil tankers, maybe the 
most competitive sectors of global shipping right now. The phenomenon of “overcapacity” 
led to extreme fluctuations in the shipping freight rates in all three basic sectors of 
maritime, but the wet and the dry bulk market were affected the most.  
 
2.2 Shipping companies and equity markets 
 
The number of shipping companies that operate in the areas of tankers and bulk carriers 
increased significantly and as a result the number of ships saw a substantial growth as well. 
Of course, this growth demanded more funding by different sources. While the number of 
companies that had gone public until then was limited, after 2000 more shipping companies 
went public in an effort to borrow money at low cost and fund their projects. This trend 
continued until the global crisis of 2008, when there was a slowdown as indexes that 
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capture the freight rates fell significantly during this year. The majority of the new comers 
in the stock exchange during that period were companies that operate in in dry and wet 
market as it is much easier to break into these markets than to break into the containership 
market. The next table summarizes all the shipping companies that executed an IPO (initial 
public offering) from 2006 to 2011. 
Year Company Year Company 
2006 
Aegean Marine Petreleum Network 
2008 
Brittania Bulk 
Chemoil Energy Limited SafeBulkers 
Danaos Corporation 2009 - 
Eitzen Chemical ASA 
2010 
Baltic Trading 
Goldenport Holdings  Costamare 
Omega Navigation Crude Carriers 
Pacific Shipping Trust Navios Maritime 
Acquisition 
Teekay Offshore Partners Scorpio Tankers 
Ultrapetrol 
2011 
Box Ships 
  2007 
Capital Product Partners Diana Containerships 
D'Amico International Shipping Golar LNG Partners 
Dockwise Hoegh LNG Holdings 
First Ship Lease SinOceanic Shipping 
Gulf Navigation 
Globus Maritime 
Hellenic Carriers 
Mercator Lines 
Navios Maritime Partners 
Nordic Tankers 
OceanFreight 
OSG Americas 
Paragon Shipping 
Rickmers Maritime 
Sinotrans Shipping 
StarBulk 
Teekay Tankers 
Table 1. List of companies that filed for IPO from 2006 to 2011 
Source: MarineMoney Publication, Volume 28, Number 4 
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It is obvious that before the global crisis of 2008 it was much easier to persuade investors 
to put money on shipping companies and take advantage of the returns that industry 
reported until then. After the crisis, however, the low freight rates and the high operational 
costs did not offer opportunities for profit. 
In particular, as the next table illustrates, shipping stocks appeared to be extremely volatile 
after 2007, which was undesirable at the time for the markets, as around the world the 
investors wanted stability until they could bounce back from the global crisis of 2008. The 
next table shows the mean return of the industry to the shareholders for those years.  
 
Mean Total Return to Shareholders 
2006 19% 
2007 52% 
2008 -55% 
2009 33% 
2010 10% 
2011 -34% 
Table 2. Mean Total Return to Shareholders for Shipping Industry 
Source: Marine Money Publication, Volume 28, Number 4 
 
In addition to the data reported in the previous table, another interesting info that 
demonstrates the same point is the impairment charges that were reported from the 
companies for fiscal year of 2011. According to the Magazine Marine Money Volume 28, 
for year 2011 the impairment charges reached a new record of 3.2 billion, which may not 
affect the cash flows but it is significant hit in the total book value. Impairment is an 
accounting principle that describes a permanent reduction in the value of a company’s 
asset, usually a fixed asset. According to GAAP, an asset of a company is to be impaired 
when its fair value falls below the book value. In this way, however, the ratios that include 
balance sheet’s data change dramatically and the financial picture of the company can be 
affected as well in a short period.  
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Of course, the markets we study in this project have been the most volatile, since the 
markets of the rest ships, those of containerships and gas carriers, did not experience such 
big fluctuations, as their financial results and the prices of their stocks show.   
 
2.3 Diploma Thesis Description 
 
As has been explained in the introduction, the scope of this project is to examine how 
valuation methods behave when applied in public shipping companies. We chose to focus 
on periods when the markets have taken a slump and shipping companies need to optimize 
their operations in order to maintain a decent performance.  
The first step of the research entailed the choice of periods we should consider during our 
valuation. We used the most popular indexes that professionals observe in order to make 
their estimations or to take the decisions. Of course, since we study two different markets 
we had to observe different type of indexes for each. 
For the tanker market we consider two indexes: 
 Baltic Dirty Tanker Index (BDTI), which refers to tankers carrying crude oil. The 
BDTI is comprised of 12 major tanker routes and it is expressed in Worldscale 
rates.  
 Baltic Clean Tanker Index (BCTI), which refers to tankers carrying refined 
products. This index is made up of six routes and it is also quoted in Worldscale 
rates.  
Shipowners have to decide whether they will put their tankers in clean market or in the 
dirty market depending on the revenues they expect they will produce. The two indexes do 
not necessarily move in the same direction the same time as the supply and the demand 
may be distorted because it is a common practice that speculators charterers of the market 
use storage tanks when price of oil is low, so that the charter freight rate go up even if the 
price oil has fallen. In a highly competitive market, where many speculators around the 
world follow such practices, it is logical that many distortions are created and the decision-
making process for the shipowners becomes extremely complicated.  
 22 
 
For the dry bulk market, there are more indexes as the Baltic Exchange has created one for 
each type of bulk carrier and some indexes specialized in some particular areas. The 
indexes that we considered are: 
 Baltic Dry Index (BDI), which is a daily average of prices to ship raw materials. It 
represents the cost paid by an end customer to have a shipping company transport 
raw materials across seas on the Baltic Exchange. It follows 22 different routes 
around the world for various materials. This is the main index that use as 
components all the other indexes that the Baltic Exchange has created and 
calculates daily. 
 Baltic Capesize Index (BCI) 
 Baltic Panamax Index (BPI) 
 Baltic Supramax Index (BSI) 
 
During our project we reached the conclusion that it would be useless to observe all the 
indexes of dry bulk market since, after research, we saw that they move similarly. So, as 
far as the dry market is concerned, we used only the Baltic Dry Index. A similar 
phenomenon was noticed at the wet market as well. The ups and downs took place during 
same periods.  
The next 3 charts illustrate the 3 indexes that we used during the research: 
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For each one of the above indexes we followed similar procedure in order to determine the 
most “interesting” for our research periods. Firstly, we determined a 10-year period as a 
sample. After considering the number of public companies for each period and the quality 
of data we could obtain from them we decided that the best choice would the period from 
2006 to 2015, as we already knew that the market during these years saw significant falls 
and the majority of the companies and, as a result, the industry struggled. Secondly, we 
had to determine which years would be under focus during our research. For this step we 
used data obtained the site investing.com. Having recorded every value of each index for 
the last day of each month, we tried to observe the fluctuations from month to month. 
Considering the fact we were going to study each company for each fiscal year we, we 
decided that it would be more useful to find the average price for each fiscal year and then 
observe the fluctuations, because the fluctuations in the period of a month are relatively 
low and it may not be indicative of the time charter contracts that a company has achieved 
to sign. To be more specific, since a company has a relatively small number of ships 
compared to the days of reported index scores, it does not make sense to record every daily 
value, because the contracts would have a fixed price according to the index price at the 
day of the memorandum of agreement (MOA). So the average index price for each year 
can be indicative of the level of freight rates that a company has agreed on during a fiscal 
year. Eventually, the measure we chose as indicative for the level of freight rates is the 
fluctuation of the average price from year to year.  
INDEX 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
BDTI 1272.42 1206.92 1498.83 582.42 885.92 800.5 720.33 658.17 762.67 810.58 
 - -5.15% 24.19% -61.14% 52.11% -9.64% -10.01% -8.63% 15.88% 6.28% 
BCTI 1096.75 980.33 1149 490.33 731.5 746.92 646.5 608 621.42 628.16 
 - -10.61% 17.21% -57.33% 49.19% 2.11% -13.44% -5.96% 2.21% 1.08% 
BDI 3239.25 7252.25 6069.833 2641.167 2674.833 1531.75 885.25 1255.75 1065.417 703.9167 
 - 123.89% -16.30% -56.49% 1.27% -42.73% -42.21% 41.85% -15.16% -33.93% 
 Table 3. Indexes’ fluctuations from 2006-2015 
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The second step of the research had to do with the choice of the companies that would be 
included in the sample of research. As explained previously, there was at the time an 
overwhelming number of public shipping companies that we could choose of in order to 
make up our sample. There were, however, some issues during the process of picking up 
the companies that would suit in our research process. The first one had to do with the 
quantity and the quality of the data that we would use. In order to obtain enough data for 
our research, we had to choose public companies that went public in 2006 or sooner, 
because the rest of the companies would not have published reports for the years under 
research. So automatically, we excluded companies that went public after 2010. The second 
issue has to do with the nature of the operations of each public company. When we started 
to examine carefully potential companies for our study we found out that many companies 
had not only strictly shipping operations but they would have other operations such as 
operating tugboats, providing technical consultancy, owning and operating fleet of 
airplanes etc. In other cases the company under examination would operate in shipping 
industry but in more than one market. The problem with such cases is that the revenues 
reported come from multiple markets and, as a result, a fall in one market would not be 
depicted in the revenues in the right way, as the revenues could stay stable if the other 
market goes up. In addition, the management teams in such companies can change their 
strategy in time and adjust their fleet and the operations so that the revenues of the company 
are not affected significantly. This situation led us to choose companies that operate in one 
market and have not expanded in more markets. In some cases the fleet contained a small 
number of ships of another market but we did not consider that this would be a problem as 
the higher percentage of the revenues would come from the market that the company has 
been categorized under.  
Unfortunately, we could not find many companies that would operate exclusively in one 
market and would have executed an IPO before 2006, so in order to create a suitable sample 
of companies, we consider companies that went public after 2006 as well.  
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The companies that we selected after the examination are: 
Wet Market 
 Navios Maritime Acquisition 
 Capital Product Tankers 
 DHT Holdings 
 Nordic American Tankers 
 Scorpio Tankers 
 Tsakos Energy Navigation 
 Frontline ltd 
 Teekay Tankers 
 Concordia Maritime 
 Torm 
 First Ship Lease 
 
Dry Bulk Market 
 Safebulkers 
 Diana Shipping 
 CMB 
 Eagle Bulk 
 Malaysian Bulk Carriers BHD 
 Genco Shipping 
 Starbulk 
 Navios Maritime Holdings 
 Dryships 
 Seanergy 
 Pacific Basin
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CHAPTER 3 
 ECONOMIC VALUE ADDED (EVA) 
 
3.1 Early valuation methods and EVA  
 
In the corporate finance realm, there have been invented many valuation techniques and 
measures, each of them considering different data of a balance sheet or income statement. 
The majority of the early valuation models relied on multiples comparison or absolute 
number comparison, as the limited choices in the market did not help the development of 
new methods. However, the vast enlargement of the public markets and the increase of the 
balance sheet and income statement data led to adoption of new valuation models or the 
adaptation of the existed models. More companies meant automatically more data to be 
observed and analyzed as well as motivation for new concepts that would give the investors 
the capability to closely observe the businesses and make detailed comparisons before 
reaching the decision-making stage.   
The first adaptation in the models was the import of new measures of cash flow (EBITDA) 
and the adoption new concepts such as Net Asset Value (NAV) and Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF). According to Rappaport (1986) within a business, there are seven drives that can 
lead to an increase in shareholder value. These are sales growth rate, operating profit 
margin , income tax rate , working capital investment, fixed capita; investment, cost of 
capital and forecast duration.  Instead of measuring each driver, new value-based 
performance measures have been created and implemented on similar companies either 
private or public.  These methods recognize the residual value created by the company for 
a specific period of time while they also make a charge for the capital employed by the 
company as it is not free. The most widely-used methods are Shareholder Value Added 
(SVA), Economic Value Added (EVA®), Market Value Added (MVA), Economic Profit 
(EP), Cash Flow Return on Investment (CFROI) and Cash Value Added (CVA).  
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During the last decade there have been conducted numerous studies about modern value-
based valuation methods and the right use of them. The reported results have been mixed 
and controversial (Maditimos, 2006).  The last decade, however, increased use of cash flow 
valuations, such as EVA, has been implemented by many investors or financial institutions 
and consultants.  
3.2 What is EVA?  
 
According to Gunther Fried (2008) EVA is a practical refinement of economists’ concept 
of residual income. In other words it measures the value remaining within a company after 
the stockholders and all the providers of capital have been compensated. Unlike “multiples 
comparison” methods, EVA is a performance measure for a time period, that range from a 
quarter or an annum, common practice in evaluating shipping companies, while sometimes 
it can be used in evaluating a fixed period of an investment or project.  
EVA was invented by Stern Stewart & Co 1, a global consulting firm in 1989 (Fraker, 
2006).  It is based on the idea that a company creates economic profit (residual income) 
when the value created by a certain project or a portfolio of projects or investments covers 
all the operating costs and the cost of capital. Unlike other valuation methods, including 
other value-based methods, EVA does not consider only the cost of interest but also the 
cost of equity. In other words, the formula includes the expected rate of return as cost of 
equity, which in combination with the cost of debt gives the total cost of capital. Only if 
the rate of return of the investment is higher than the cost of capital, positive value is being 
created for the shareholders and their demands are fulfilled (positive rate of return). This 
opinion is also supported by Peter Drucker in a Harvard Business Review article, where 
valuation methods of conventional accounting are also criticized: “Until a business returns 
a profit that is greater than its cost of capital, it operates at a loss. Never mind that it pays 
taxes as if it had a genuine profit. The enterprise still returns less to the economy than it 
devours in resources…until then it does not create wealth; it destroys it”. According to 
Shil (2009), another advantage of EVA  compared with other valuation practices is that it 
corrects  and adjusts all the distortions that are prevalent in then information generated by 
the accounting practices. Furthermore, depending on the investor’s purpose, it can be used 
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in comparing companies of different industries when it comes to portfolio management 
practices. Nevertheless, it is recommended that EVA is used for comparison between 
companies that are similar in size (in term of assets and revenues), because the increase in 
operating profits is substantial compared to the one of the assets of the company. 
EVA can also be recognized as a management tool used by executive directors in order to 
closely observe the operation and performance of departments individually or the 
performance of the company as a whole unit. Especially when it comes into corporate 
groups, where two or more corporations engaged in entirely different business areas fall 
under the same a conglomerate, the value-based approach such as EVA is superior to other 
accounting methods because it recognizes the cost of capital for its subsidiary and the 
riskiness for each one. Operating in different business areas and markets, each subsidiary 
bears different interest expenses as the cost of capital differs from sector to sector. Unlike 
traditional measures, EVA includes the cost of equity and the cost of debt in its formula so 
that the impact of interest bearing debt as well as of the return the investors anticipate is 
depicted in the final value after the operating profit. Other non-value-based valuation have 
the drawback that results are mainly a rate of return but by maximizing these rates does not 
necessarily results in return maximization for the shareholders. Such rates are return on 
investment (ROI), return on invested capital (ROIC), return on capital employed (ROCE), 
return on net assets (RONA) and return on assets (ROA). All these rates can mislead 
investors and managers since highest gross margin on sales of a company does not 
necessarily indicate that the current strategy produces the highest profit possible. 
Compared to other value-based measures EVA is less complicated as the other methods 
are based on specific cash flows or consider more data such as depreciation that makes the 
measure more subjective than EVA. Taking into account subjective data can lead into 
different conclusions or even distortions of the outcome depending on different human 
perceptions. Of course, these methods can be more effective under certain conditions and 
common perception between analysts. According to Klinkermann (1997), however, EVA 
is more useful and more widely used just because it is easier for more people to understand 
it and implement it in the same way so that the subjective perceptions be eliminated.  
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Two similar valuation techniques are discounted cash flow (DCF) and net present value 
(NPV). According to these methods the value of a company is derived from present value 
of future incomes. The core of these models is working with time value of future incomes. 
EVA can be used in a similar way for future cash flows and in this occasion the results are 
similar to those of DCF and NPV (Maditimos, 2006). In other occasions it can be used as 
a performance measure for past periods and then make comparisons between companies 
under evaluation for specific fluctuations in the market. That’s exactly what the present 
project is about. 
On the other hand, EVA presents also some limitations that should be considered before 
its implementation.  First of all, it is criticized to be a short-term measure and that it does 
not suit in companies with focus on long-term investments. In order to avoid this pitfall 
during the project, companies with high growth rate were excluded from the study. 
Secondly, in connection with the first criticize, there can be no objective measurement of 
EVA for long-term investments as future returns cannot be measured.  This problem is 
presented mainly when EVA is used not as a performance measure (periodic EVA) but 
when it takes into account future cash flows estimations. Another problem presented in 
EVA use is inflation. Especially periodic EVA fails to consider inflation during the 
valuation and, as a result, the residual income does not depict the true impact on owners’ 
wealth. Last but not least, EVA cannot be used for special research purposes such as 
distress prediction, where traditional financial rations have been more efficient.
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3.3 EVA Calculation 
3.3.1 EVA formula 
 
As it has been explained, there are two major ways a company can improve its economic 
value added (EVA). The first is to increase its revenues and the second is to decrease its 
capital costs.  For the former method the EVA formula uses Net Operating Profit After Tax 
(NOPAT) while the latter method is expressed by considering the capital costs. In this way, 
EVA is calculated by subtracting the capital charges from NOPAT1: 
 
𝐸𝑉𝐴 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 × 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 
𝑤𝑎𝑐𝑐: 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
 
If the EVA is positive the company creates value for the owners, whereas a negative EVA 
reflects that owners’ wealth gets reduced.  
The last formula is derived from the initial fundamental concept of EVA which is that a 
company can produce positive economic value if the rate of return on capital r is higher 
than the cost of capital c. In other words, the perspective is that EVA is a spread between 
a firm’s return on invested capital (ROIC) and the cost of capital multiplied by the total 
capital invested2. 
 
𝐸𝑉𝐴 = (𝑟 − 𝑐) × 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 → 
𝐸𝑉𝐴 = (𝑟 × 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) − (𝑐 × 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)  →  
𝑬𝑽𝑨 = 𝑵𝑶𝑷𝑨𝑻 − (𝒄 × 𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍)
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Of course the capital of a company consists of equity and debt, which have different interest 
expenses. In addition, the debt usually consists of different loans, each of which has 
different interest rate. For these reasons, when the formula is implemented a weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) is used.  
The next paragraphs illustrate the way the three components (NOPAT, WACC, capital) of 
EVA formula are calculated. 
 
3.3.2 Calculation of Net Operating Profit After Taxes (NOPAT) 
 
The first step in calculating EVA is to make adjustments to a company’s net income in 
order to produce its NOPAT. These adjustments are necessary as the net income has to be 
calculated according to the “generally accepted accounting principles”, which often distort 
the current economic measured of a company. Of course, the adjustments must have been 
determined before the valuation and must be the same for all the companies under research. 
Stern & Co., the consulting company that introduced EVA, has identified more than 120 
potential adjustments that can be made in a company’s net income in areas such as R&D, 
inventory, costing, depreciation and amortization. However, usually no more than ten 
adjustments are sufficient before the calculation of NOPAT. The choice of the adjustments 
depends on various factors such as the industry under research and the strategy of the 
company. The strategy of a company plays a crucial role, because, during periods when 
companies invest in new projects or assets in order to grow in size, it is usual that they will 
not perform as high profitability as before.  Of course, the investors expect from such 
companies to deliver higher profit margin in the future. The way these adjustments will be 
made depends on company’s reports (balance sheets and income statements). Usually 
analysts do not meet major problems as the data provided with those reports are regulated 
by GAAP. Nevertheless, since there is almost always a bias in the perceptions of some 
assets or transactions, companies’ CFOs should clarify some statements or practices. For 
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public companies, these clarifications can be found in the annual report that is published 
each year.   
Unlike, the other two components of EVA, capital and WACC, NOPAT plays the most 
vital role in fluctuations that can be observed in the EVA of a company during a series of 
years. That happens because cost of capital from year to year does not fluctuate as much 
as revenues and subsequently profit. On the other hand, in some industries, such as 
maritime, the potential earnings from year to year fluctuate in such degree that EVA 
formula can produce a highly negative result after a highly positive year. During our 
research this trend was obvious at dry bulk shipping companies during years that shipping 
freight rates fell more than 50% in one year.  The interest expenses cannot deviate 
considerably from year to year because the interest rates as well as the capital employed 
do not fluctuate as much for reasons that will be explained in next paragraphs. 
 
NOPAT and adjustments in our study 
During the data collection for our study we use all the available annual reports issued by 
the companies under valuation for the years 2006-2015. Some companies provided the 
value of NOPAT while other companies provided other income or revenue data that could 
lead to NOPAT after some adjustments. These adjustments are made in order to convert 
the accounting profit into economic profit, which is the one that affects owners’ wealth 
straightforward. In many cases the reported number would be EBIT (earnings before 
interest taxes). Then NOPAT is derived from EBIT by subtracting the calculated taxes as 
shown: 
 
𝑵𝑶𝑷𝑨𝑻 = 𝑬𝑩𝑰𝑻 × (𝟏 − 𝒕) 3 
t: tax interest
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The tax interest is provided in the same annual report.  Usually investors observe it because 
it can show the competitiveness of a business based on the country it is incorporated. In 
addition, in case of a tax reform the analysts must make updated estimations for future 
results. 
 
3.3.3 Calculation of Capital Employed 
 
The value of capital that must be used in EVA calculation must be defined after adjustments 
in order to isolate the interest-bearing liabilities. Of course, the first source of the essential 
data is the balance sheet where all the assets and liabilities are recorded.  However, these 
items are not listed as funding sources which would be the ideal scenario, if we wanted to 
implement the formula instantly.  Consequently, all the non-interest-bearing liabilities or 
assets has to be excluded from the list. Depending on which column of the balance is used, 
the invented capital can be calculated either as liability or as asset. However, in some cases 
the interest bearing capital can be calculated from other sources that are included in the 
report. That depends on the company policy as the GAAP does not mandate that a list of 
borrowing funds be included in the annual report of public companies.   
Public maritime companies are high leveraged (high debt to equity ratio), which means that 
they have high interest expenses. Depending on financing strategies, similar companies in 
size and business can have extremely different interest expenses. That happens because 
there are four main ways of financing ships (Stopford, 2009): equity, debt, newbuilding 
finance and leasing. Usually shipping companies use interest-bearing funds (mainly loans 
and sometimes bonds) when they want to invest in new investment projects (newbuilding 
ships) and the majority of the company’s equity is raised during initial public offerings 
(IPOs) while secondary share offerings are less popular, as they are used only when the 
management team judges that the cost of raising money thorough a secondary offering 
would be lower than taking a loan from an institution. So the new ships act as collateral to 
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these liabilities and in case of default the underwriters have the right to detain them. 
Because most of the times  the newbuilding project entails more than one ship, the 
financing is completed including loans, additional share offering and cash. However, the 
majority of the amount spent is derived from loan or loans. In order to calculate the interest-
bearing funds we use a list of these loans which is usually provided in the annual report of 
each company or we use the balance sheet to see the fixed assets of the company. The last 
method is not state of the art but as mentioned the majority of public companies finance 
their projects with loans.  In other rare cases the whole amount of interest expense is 
provided and we can use this figure in order to avoid the multiplication WACC × 
CAPITAL which provides approximation of the cost of capital for reasons that will be 
explained in the next paragraph.  
As “fixed asset” we recognize all the tangible assets, property, plant and equipment that a 
company owns and exploit them in its operations. In shipping industry the fixed assets are 
the vessels chartered to clients. Unlike other industries where companies might have 
diversity in the services they provide, in maritime the only service is shipping service which 
is provided through ships. The majority of shipping companies report the current value of 
their vessels and other properties the hold in business centers that are usually commercial 
agencies. During our research we used the value of interest-bearing debt that the company 
reported, while in some cases that there was no info reported we use the value of the vessels 
owned by the company. 
 
3.3.4 Calculation of Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
 
The estimation of cost of capital is the greatest challenge during the implementation of 
EVA.  The level cost of capital depends primarily not on the source of the money but on 
the use of the funds. Usually the provider of the funds (capital markets, commercial banks, 
private funds, individual investors) determine the level of the interest rate according to 
various factors such as business risk , current interest level, LIBOR, macroeconomic 
variables, financial structure and volatility of incomes. Generally in business world the 
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interest rate represents the minimum acceptable rate of return on the investment from the 
viewpoint of investors and creditors. 
In companies under research the capital consists of two parts: equity and debt (liabilities).  
The equity represents the part of a company that is left after all liabilities have been 
deducted and it is owned by the shareholders. For purposes of liquidation after a 
bankruptcy, it represents the value of the company that is left for the stockholders after all 
liabilities are paid to the creditors.  The equity is raised through the stock market which is 
difficult to access. Especially for shipping companies there are two major difficulties 
according to Stopford, which are even worse for small shipping companies. The first and 
most important is the volatility in the earnings that shipping companies present as a 
consequence of shipping cycle while investors look for consistent results. The other issue 
has to do with the corporate structure required by the equity markets. Usually the structure 
of public companies is stricter compared to that of private companies as major investors 
and creditors demand that the strategy is constantly observed and evaluated.  For this 
reason, there is usually an auditor inside the company who observes the daily proceedings 
and constantly records the decisions made by directors. The above policies slow down the 
decision-making procedure inside the firm, which is a disadvantage for shipping companies 
as the volatile market as well as its nature (decisions over spot or time charters, decision 
on routes and areas etc.) demand fast reactions if not pro-actions.  
Debt represents the value of the liabilities that company has to another party (lender, 
creditor). The majority of shipping companies hold a portfolio of loans that use to finance 
their operations. Usually those loans are used to finance the newbuilding projects and the 
vessels act as collateral to them until their full repayment, which is usually balloon 
repayment.  The repayment period depends mainly on the value of the loan and duration of 
the project but it is a usual practice that an extension is provided during periods of low 
freight rates in the market.  As far as the interest rate is concerned, loans are generally made 
at spread over LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate). The companies we studied during 
the project usually reported a spread that ranged from 0.8% to 2 %. 
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Cost of Equity  
The cost of equity represents the rate of return that investors expect. In other words, it is 
compensation the market demands in exchange for owning the asset and bearing the risk 
of it. Of course, there are many ways to calculate the cost of equity and there is also a bias 
in it as each investor can have different expectations and estimations on the companies. 
Nevertheless, there are some models that are used from the majority of the investors to 
estimate an expected rate of return. These models take into account many variables before 
present an estimation such as current market trends, past-stock performance growth rates 
etc. During the implementation of EVA the recommended model for the calculation of the 
cost of equity is CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model). 
The general idea behind the CAPM is that investors demand to earn a compensation for 
two reasons (Bodie, Kane, Markus, 2014). The time value of money and risk. The time 
value of money is represented by the risk-free rate in the formula and compensates the 
investors for placing a part of their wealth in any investment over a period of time. In 
finance the risk-free rate investment is defined as one where we know the expected return 
with certainty. Of course, there are two basic conditions that have to be met in order an 
investment to be considered risk-free and subsequently define the risk-free rate on the 
market for the current period (Damodaran, 2008). The first one is that there must be no 
default risk.  Such securities are usually government securities, not because governments 
are experts at running business, but because they can control the printing of money. So they 
can honor claims that have been made. The second condition is that there can be no 
reinvestment risk. In case a part of the return was reinvested then the estimation of the 
expected return will not meet the actual return and there is extra risk that investors have to 
bear. It is common practice to take the yield on government bonds as the actual risk free 
rate.  During our valuation we used the yield on the 10-year U.S bond for each year. We 
used data that we found at Damodaran site.  
The other half of the CAPM formula represents risk and calculates the amount of 
compensation the investor needs for taking on additional risk. This is calculated by taking 
a risk measure (beta) that compares the returns of the asset to the market over a period of 
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time and to the market premium (rm-rf): the return of the market in excess of the risk-free 
rate. Beta reflects how risky an asset is, compared to overall market risk and is a function 
of the volatility of the asset and the market as well as the correlation between the two. For 
stocks, the market is usually represented by index S&P 500 but in special cases it can be 
represented by more robust indexes as well. During our research we use the risk premium 
found in Damodaran site for each year and we obtained the beta value for each stock from 
yahoo finance site. 
The formula for calculating the cost of equity is 4 : 
 
𝐶𝐸 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽 × (𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) → 
 
𝑪𝑬 = 𝒓𝒇 + 𝜷 × 𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒊𝒖𝒎 
 
CE = Cost of Equity 
rf = risk free rate 
β = stock beta 
rm = market return 
 
Cost of Debt  
Contrary to cost of equity, cost of debt is much easier to be calculated as it is expressed 
straightforward in the contracts of the loans. As mentioned in previous paragraph it is 
usually contracted as a spread over LIBOR, in other words it is usually a floating rate and 
it is expressed as a percentage of the loan. Since the companies we studied are public and 
the competitiveness is high, there is constant intention for company growth and higher 
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performance compared to competitors. For these reasons, all the companies held a portfolio 
of loans (and sometimes corporate bonds) from different sources and each one has different 
contracted floating rate. Fortunately, the annual reports provided by the companies 
included weighted average cost of debt.  So, during our research, there was no need for 
calculation of the cost of debt.   
 
WACC calculation 
The last step before calculating EVA is the calculation of the cost of capital, which is easy 
after the estimation of cost of equity and the record of interest rates on the liabilities have 
completed. We use the formula described below 5: 
 
𝑾𝑨𝑪𝑪 = 𝑪𝑬 ×
𝑬
𝑪
+ 𝑪𝑫 ×
𝑫
𝑪
 
 
C = Capital = Equity + Debt 
E = Value of Equity 
D = Value of Debt  
CE = Cost of Equity 
CD = Cost of Debt 
WACC = Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
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CHAPTER 4 
Altman (Z) – Score 
 
4.1 Distress situations and bankruptcy prediction 
 
As the study focuses on evaluating companies and their performance during turbulence in 
the markets, it is reasonable that some of these companies will have such a poor 
performance that the likelihood of bankruptcy increases. Corporate bankruptcy has been a 
major issue in business areas for a long period. There are multiple factors that contribute 
to bankruptcies and other distressed conditions but usually the most frequent reasons are 
(Altman and Hotchkiss 2006): 
 Chronically sick industries (e.g. agriculture and textiles) 
 Deregulation of industries (e.g. airlines, financial services, health care, energy) 
 High real interest rates in certain periods 
 International competition 
 Overcapacity within an industry 
 Increased leveraging of corporations 
 Relatively high new business formation rates in certain periods 
Even those reasons alone, however, cannot lead a firm to bankruptcy.  Most of the times 
some of these conditions in combination with managerial incompetence is the main reason 
firms run out of cash and other liquid funds. 
Bankruptcy of mid-cap and large-cap companies* can have major impacts in investors’ 
portfolios and wealth. For this reason there have been created several methods and 
techniques that try to estimate the likelihood of a company going bankrupt. According to 
Fitzpatrick (1932), Merwin (1942), Horrigan (1965) the first methods were extremely 
simple and naïve considering their evolution afterwards. These methods were actually 
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based on calculating financial rations of already bankrupt ratios and comparing them with 
those of non-bankrupt firms. These models did not attempt to predict a bankruptcy but their 
purpose was only to analyze financial rations of non-bankrupt companies separately. The 
first valuation method on predicting bankruptcy was introduced by Beaver in 1966. 
However, even this model was still univariate as the first multivariate method was 
introduced a few years later, in 1968 by Altman. Altman used multiple discriminant 
analysis to predict corporate failure. 
In his study about corporate failure, he supported that the use of a multivariate model was 
necessary if the aim of the problem is the prediction of a bankruptcy, whereas the other 
univariate models could only act as an indicators of bankruptcy and not as a predictors.  
At present, it might seem obvious that one variable or ratio alone cannot be a signal for 
potential bankruptcy, but the two periods (2010s and 1960s) have some fundamental 
differences. First and foremost the number of companies has increased significantly from 
1930s, when the first models were introduced, to 1960s, when Altman introduced his 
multivariate method for the first time, and from 1960s to 2010s. Economists did not have 
the data and the experience to introduce new valuation methods as Altman did in 1968 or 
improve the old ones as Altman did in 2000 when he introduced some modifications in 
order make the model suitable for valuating private firms as well. Secondly the observation 
on those companies and the information available to the public has increased substantially. 
Either for regulation purposes or for performance evaluation the income statements and the 
balance sheets were enriched with more detailed data and concepts of accounting that allow 
analysts, investors or even the managers of the companies to observe the company 
performance, evaluate the financial position at the time and predict the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. Asset manager investors need to have reliable tools for the selection of 
companies into their portfolios.  However, the whole concept of portfolios is that each 
manager or company has different expectations of the market, which, if analyzed in more 
detail, means that there are different expectations on how the companies-investments will 
perform. That’s the reason each investor can use different modifications on each model or 
even interpret the same results in a different way.  That’s the reason that some financially 
distressed companies still find the necessary funds to save themselves even if their 
performance is poorer than that of other companies in similar position. Financial distress 
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of the companies is on the one hand detrimental to investor returns, but, on the other hand, 
higher risk might give opportunities for higher returns. Responsible for assessing such  
securities and the risk issues with each one is the rating agencies whose main job is to give 
estimations of the bankruptcy probability depending on such tools. Usually investors hire 
such rating agencies as consultants before they invest money in public distressed 
companies, as they are supposed to be more expertized in such assessments.   
 
4.2 Altman’s Z – Score 
 
Altman’s original Z-Score was based on a sample of 66 publicly held manufacturing 
companies. Half of the companies were distressed manufacturers that had filed for 
bankruptcy from 1946 through 1965, while the other half were, randomly selected, non-
bankrupt companies from the same time period. The asset size of each one of the companies 
ranged from $1 million to $25 million (Altman, 2000). Due to the large number of variables 
that may be significant indicators of financial distress, Altman chose 22 financial ratios 
based on relevancy and their popularity in the market. His goal was to find a small number 
of ratios that could best distinguish between bankrupted and non-bankrupted corporations. 
From these 22 ratios, five were selected as being the best combination to predict corporate 
bankruptcy. These five ratios are 6: 
 
A: Working Capital/Total Assets 
The working capital/total assets ratio is a measure of the net liquid assets of the firm relative 
to the total capitalization. Working capital is equal to the difference between current assets 
and current liabilities, while total assets include both current and fixed assets (non-current 
assets). In this ratio, liquidity and size characteristics are taken into account. A firm that 
reports operating losses for a considerable period will have low ratio of working capital to 
total assets as in such cases the current assets are the first to be decreased. 
 
B: Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
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analysis of Altman’s Z-Score Model”, New York University 
Retained earnings report the accumulated reinvested earnings or losses of a firm. It is found 
in the Stockholders Equity section of the Balance Sheet. The ratio measures the cumulative 
long-term profitability of the company and implicitly considers the age of a firm. Studies
have shown that corporate failures are much more common in a firm’s earlier years, as 
many firms that go bankrupt are relatively the young ones that have not yet had the time to 
build up their cumulative earnings. Hence, it makes sense that young companies are more 
likely to default on their obligations. In addition, ratio B measures the leverage of a firm. 
Companies with high retained earnings relatively to total assets have to a greater extent 
financed their assets through retention of earnings rather than debt financing, which may 
reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
 
C: Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets 
This ratio illustrates the productivity of the company’s assets before tax or leverage factors 
are taken into consideration. Firms depend on operating efficiently through the earning 
power of their assets in order to have long-term viability. Return on total assets appears to 
be particularly appropriate for predicting bankruptcies, since it has the highest weight 
coefficient in each one of the Z-Score models. EBIT is found in the company’s Income 
Statement. 
 
D: Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities 
The market value of equity is the combined market value of all shares of common and 
preferred stock. Total liabilities include all current and long-term liabilities found in the 
firm’s Balance Sheet. Ratio D indicates how much the company’s assets can decline in 
value before the liabilities exceed the assets and it becomes insolvent. Equity to debt also 
emphasizes the leverage of the firm. The higher the debt is, relatively to the equity, the 
higher the risk is for the stakeholders of the firm. In addition, this ratio adds a market 
dimension to the Z-Score, within the meaning that falling stock prices and subsequently 
decreasing market capitalization, may be a sign of upcoming problems. This should ensure 
that systematic risk is incorporated in the model, which is essential when considering public 
companies that might be affected by unexpected events such a financial crisis. The market 
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value of a company is inherently connected with its credit capability. This happens because 
when the stock market sentiment is overall positive, and stock prices are high, it is much 
easier for a company to borrow money and attract cash on the stock exchange through 
equity issues. Thus, the market value’s impact on ratio D partly incorporates    the     funding  
accessibility of enterprises in the Z-Score model, in the sense that a low ratio may indicate 
that the company might encounter difficulties in obtaining financing, which is an indicator 
of bankruptcy in the near future if the firm is already in distressed position.  
 
X5: Sales/Total Assets 
The turnover-asset ratio is a standard financial ratio measuring the ability of the company’s 
assets to generate sales and the management’s capacity in dealing with competitive 
conditions. Sales are referred to as revenues in the company's Income Statement. Another 
measure that could also be used instead of Sales is net sales, which reflects the deduction 
of returns, allowances and discounts. Altman found that ratio E is the least significant on 
individual basis, but it is quite important for manufacturers because of its unique 
relationship to the other ratios in the Z-Score.   
 
Depending on the industry of the companies studied the Z-Score formula undergoes some 
modifications before the calculation.  The modifications are applied mainly on the 
coefficients of the ratios that are included in the formula. The initial concept of Z-Score 
was:   
 
𝑍 = 1.2 × 𝐴 + 1.4 × 𝐵 + 3.3 × 𝐶 + 0.6 × 𝐷 + 1.0 × 𝐸 
 
Altman provided some boundary zones for interpretation of the results: 
 
 Z > 2.99 : Grey Zone : Considered financially healthy 
 1.81 < Z <2.99 : Grey Zone : Could go either way 
 Z < 1.81 : Distress Zone : Risk that the company will go bankrupt within 2 years 
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Because of the limitations of the initial formula (created for public manufacturing 
companies exclusively), Altman proposed a series of changes in the formula in order to 
expand the usefulness of the model to other companies. The first modification was about 
ratio D. Instead of Market Value of Equity, Altman proposed Book Value of Equity to be 
included in the ratio.  In this way, Altman avoids restricting its applicability to public 
companies. Of course, there should also be some change in the coefficient of ratio D 
because the weight of the Book Value of Equity is different than the Market Value of 
Equity. Hence, it is recommended to reduce the coefficient of ratio D, even though it has 
already the lowest weight of the other four coefficients.  
 
The other issue in the model is the ratio E, which includes Asset turnover. As Asset 
Turnover varies significantly depending on the industry under research, Altman proposed 
to exclude this ratio when the model is used for valuation of private companies. In this 
way, we minimize the sensitivity of industry effect, which makes the model useful for a 
wider range of companies. As an example, Altman compared data from retail and service 
companies to prove that the retail companies had significantly higher turnover ratio than 
service companies. As a result, if the original model was employed to predict bankruptcy 
in service firms (non-manufacturing firms) the scores would underpredict bankruptcy.  
That’s an issue that we considered before we choose which model to use during the present 
project.  
 
Having proposed these modifications, Altman named the new model as Z΄΄- score and 
proposed the new boundary zones (Altman, 1984): 
 
 
𝑍′′ = 3.25 + 6.56 × 𝐴 + 3.26 × 𝐵 + 6.72 × 𝐶 + 1.05 × 𝐷 
 
Altman provided some boundary zones for interpretation of the results: 
 
 Z > 5.85 : Grey Zone : Considered financially healthy 
 4.35 < Z < 5.85 : Grey Zone : Could go either way 
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 Z < 4.35 : Distress Zone : Risk that the company will go bankrupt within 2 years 
 
 
 
4.3 Problems and limitations of Z-Score models 
 
The Z-Score models have proven to be a reliable tool for predicting corporate failures in a 
broad variety of contexts and markets. However, it should be noted that the Z-Score is not 
valid in every situation, as the models have drawn several objections over the years. 
 
The first issue that Z-score models have to do with is the selection of suitable firms for 
valuation, as it is important to use companies that have assets more than 25 million because 
in different occasion the ratios will not be suitable for the calculation of a reliable Z-score.  
According to Altman (2000), the financial ratios, have the effect of deflating statistics by 
size, and therefore a good deal of the size effect is eliminated. 
 
Another issue with these models is the quality of the data used. As the data are taken from 
balance sheets and income statements which are unaudited, (only the annual report is 
required to be audited) possible write-offs can have dramatic impacts in the Z-scores from 
quarter to quarter. In other words, those models are extremely sensitive to false accounting 
practices. As an example Altman refers to retained earnings to total assets ratio which is 
subject to manipulation via corporate quasi-reorganizations and dividend declarations 
causing bias among analysts. Z”- score model for non-manufactures is more vulnerable to 
potential manipulation of accounting data than the original Z-score model. In particular, 
because the market value of equity has been substituted by the book value of equity, Z” - 
score cannot detect potential reaction of the market in new-published news for the 
company. The market reacts to bad or good news that can influence the company’s 
performance, but in most of those cases these news cannot have immediate impact on the 
firm’s balance sheet. Of course this is the way the public companies operate as they are 
obliged by the regulations to disclose such kind of information. On the other hand, private 
companies are not obliged to follow such practices, so in case there is an incident like an 
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unexpected failure in a project that will damage the income flow of the company, the Z”-
score model will not be able to detect it as the book value cannot show the reaction of the 
market to these news.  
 
There are, however, some occasions, when the market volatility can have negative impact 
on the results produced by the original Z - score (Aasen, 2011). During periods when the 
stock market is relatively high, the Z-score outcomes will be higher than in times when 
stock prices are low. Mispriced stock, which is a common phenomenon especially during 
periods of bubbles, can create bias among the Z-scores.  That is the main reason, it is 
recommended to supplement the results coming from Z-model with results coming from 
other analytical tools. 
 
Last but not least, we have to point out that Z - score models are not suitable for evaluating 
financial firms (Aasen, 2011). The frequent use of off-balance-sheet items such as 
securities and other investment instruments create a portfolio, whose value can change 
significantly from day to day and affect the value of assets on the balance sheet and 
consequently the outcome of Z-score model.  
 
4.4 Use of Altman (Z) models in maritime industry 
 
In our research we had to deal with an industry with many ups and downs in the last decade 
and high leveraged companies. We used the Z-score model because we studied public 
companies exclusively.  As it has been explained in previous chapter, public maritime 
companies use mainly borrowed funds, such as loans and bonds, to finance their projects 
and as a result they have always high liabilities to equity ratio. The many fluctuations 
observed in the market influence the revenues of the companies and especially the dry 
market companies return highly disappointing results for the investors. As a result, during 
our calculations we obtained extremely low results for some companies although the 
investors seem to still support them since they have not dumped their shares yet. The reason 
for that phenomenon is that when they are compared with other companies in the industry 
some companies have the potential of an uptrend when the market recovers. Of course, 
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some companies cannot avoid the bankruptcy and the asset seizure as it has happened in 
many companies after periods when market is low. For this reason, the interpretation of the 
results is based on comparing the results according to the number and type of ships, 
deadweight on the water and value of assets. Our research showed that a reliable measure 
that depicts the size of the company in terms of owned vessels and deadweight on water is 
the fixed assets as they are reported in a balance sheet, because the fixed assets entails the 
value of the vessels owned. So it is used as measure of size when then companies are 
categorized according to the fleet. In this way, we try to see if the companies that 
underperform or on the other hand those that overperform have some characteristics in 
common.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
53 
  
 
  
    
54 
  
CHAPTER 5 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 
 
5.1 Introduction to DEA 
 
The third method that was used during this diploma thesis is the “Data Envelopment 
Analysis” or, in other words, DEA, as it is usually called. This method is based on linear 
programming for measuring the relative performance of organizational units in cases where 
there are multiple inputs and outputs. It was originally developed by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes in 1978 to evaluate nonprofit and public sector organizations such as banks, 
hospitals, schools. However, the last years its use has expanded in many other business 
fields and industries, because it has been proven to be able to locate problems and 
deficiencies that are not visible with other valuation techniques.  
The basic concept of DEA is based on the fact that no matter what companies or 
organizations are under examination they can all be seen as producers. Each producer 
implements a production process where a varying level of inputs gives out a varying level 
of outputs. Depending on the industry and on the scope the examiner has on the issue, the 
number of variables used can change. For example, consider a shipping company. Each 
shipping company employs a certain number of vessels, to transfer goods providing service 
to many different charterers. However, there are numerous ways to exploit the ships and 
their service capabilities and each company choose a different way to do that. As each 
company has different size in terms of assets, owned vessels, chartered vessels from other 
companies, it is difficult to determine which one is “the best” or “the most efficient”.  
The general concept behind this example is that, if a given producer, A, is capable of 
producing Y(A) units of output with X(A) inputs, another producer, call him B, should also 
be able to do the same with the assumption that both must perform equally efficiently. 
Similarly, if producer B is capable of producing Y(B) units of output with X(B) inputs, 
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then other producers should also be capable of the same production schedule. Producers A, 
B, and others can then be combined to form a composite producer with composite inputs 
and composite outputs. Since this composite producer does not necessarily exist, it is 
typically called a virtual producer. The heart of the analysis lies in finding the "best" virtual 
producer for each real producer. If the virtual producer is better than the original producer 
by either making more output with the same input or making the same output with less 
input then the original producer is inefficient. The last analysis might look like a vicious 
circle, but in real world the valuation process with DEA detects one best virtual producer 
and, afterwards, the rest of the producers are credited according to the relative efficiency.  
In other words, DEA is a form of frontier analysis that recognizes that some DMUs perform 
below optimum levels. In this method, each DMU is optimized against all other DMUs. 
That is, the linear program assigns weights to the variables such that each DMU looks the 
"best" it can be. DEA constructs the efficiency frontier and calculates the efficiency score 
for each DMU based on its distance from the frontier. Depending on the orientation the 
analyst has assigned to the program, our model can be input-oriented or output-oriented. 
An input oriented problem focuses on maximizing the company’s performance by reducing 
its inputs, or in other words, produces the observed outputs with the optimum resource 
level.  On the other hand, an output-oriented program focuses on maximizing the unit’s 
performance by increasing the outputs given that inputs remain stable.  
Whereas these type of models use only inputs or outputs in the objective function as 
controllable factors, there have been invented some more extensive models where inputs 
and outputs are simultaneously inserted into the function to calculate the efficiency for 
each company.  Slacks-Based Model or SBM, as it is called, is one of these models 
(Anadol, 2014). During our study, however, only the traditional radial models were used 
and in all cases we chose input-oriented models.  
Contrary to other valuation methods and especially methods that are based on indexes, 
DEA has the advantage that is focuses on a single estimation, one number, which depicts 
how efficient has been the use of the inputs compared to the outputs and consequently the 
value added that has been achieved.  When we use traditional rations for valuation 
purposes, such as comparable ratios, the result depicts only partial efficiency or 
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inefficiency in only a part of the operation of the company, which does not provide any 
information about the overall valuation of the company compared to other companies. In 
addition, when such methods are used the analysts usually determine the efficient 
companies as those that exceed an average value, which is not a reliable result statistically, 
because the average value or whichever value has been chosen as significant value can 
significantly deviate if the results of our sample have high standard deviation. So the 
comparison with many ratios, each of which depicts only a part of the whole commercial 
activities of the company cannot provide as much info as a DEA model provides. DEA can 
make a valuation in many different ways according to the nature of the industry and with 
many different adjustments depending the purpose of the research. That can happen by 
creating more than one model, each of which can have multiples outputs and inputs of 
different combinations. In that way we can see the efficiency of one company relatively to 
the other companies of the group for inputs or outputs that do not even have the same 
measure units. In our research we did not use models with different units as all the variables 
we used came from the balance sheet where everything is measured in dollars. However, 
there have been studies where there are two different inputs that have different measure 
units.  
 
What does DEA do? 
As Cooper mentions in his textbook “Data Envelopment Analysis”, Springer, there can be 
4 different perspectives on the use of DEA: 
1. First of all, DEA compares service units considering all resources used and services 
provided in order to identify all the efficient and inefficient units of the sample. 
This is achieved by comparing the mix and volume of all services provided and 
resources used by each company or unit with those of other companies or units.  
2. Secondly, the identification of inefficient units helps the examiners to examine 
these units thoroughly and make them more efficient by implementing new, better 
practices. In this way, the inefficient units might achieve potential savings and 
approach the best units. In addition, DEA estimates the amount of additional service 
an inefficient unit can provide without the need to use additional resources.  
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3. The last point is connected with the fact that DEA can calculate the amount and 
type of cost and resource savings that can be achieved.  
4. From management perspective, DEA can help the transformation of information 
from efficient units of a company to inefficient units of the company. In this way, 
the managerial expertise will contribute into the improvement of the productivity 
of the inefficient units, which means that the costs will decline the profitability will 
increase. 
 
These four types of information show how valuable DEA is as they prove that DEA can 
identify relationships that are not identifiable with alternative techniques. The comparison 
with better companies reveal the weaknesses of inefficient companies and the sectors 
where better performance is required. Of course, in order to reach a conclusion the analyst 
has to define carefully the model and its variables. Depending on the variables used as well 
as the combinations made with them numerous models can be created and each one can 
deliver different outcomes that can be interpreted differently.  
 
Except the aforementioned fundamental uses of DEA, there is another one which is the one 
which our research perspective is based on. That is the changes in efficiencies year after 
year. Throughout our research with DEA what we do is to observe the variations in the 
scores that each company achieves from year to year. During the valuation with DEA we 
obtain results in percent form (100%, 90% etc.) and then we calculate the relative 
difference from the previous year to see how the company reacted to market fall. In this 
way we can evaluate how efficient was a company’s reaction to the declining market not 
only compared to other companies, but also compared to the performance of the same 
company during the previous years. 
 
Compared to other valuation techniques DEA has specific advantages and disadvantages 
that are listed below: 
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Advantages: 
 
 DEA takes into consideration many inputs and outputs 
 There are no conditions or functions between inputs and outputs, so the method is 
very simple 
 Each unit is directly compared to other similar units or their combination 
 The inputs and outputs can have completely different units of measurement if 
required 
 
Disadvantages: 
 
 As all valuation methods  and all optimization techniques, DEA can have flaws that 
create significant problems and deviation  
 DEA calculates the relative efficiency and not the real efficiency. In other words, 
each unit is compared with other similar companies and not with the theoretical 
optimum performance that it could achieve 
 Each unit demands a separate problem of linear programming, so big research 
projects with big data bases require a significant amount of time to be solved. For 
cases like these special software programs are required 
 
5.2 How does DEA work? 
 
As mentioned the DEA is a linear programming-based technique for measuring the 
performance efficiency of units which are called Decision-Making Units or DMUs. 
Efficiency can be simply defined as the ratio of output to input. More output per input 
reflects relatively greater efficiency. If the greatest possible output per unit of input is 
achieved, the company has reached a state of optimum efficiency and it is not possible the 
company to become more efficient without new technology or other changes in the 
production process.   So the basic measure used in DEA is the ratio of total outputs to total 
inputs 7,8: 
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Εθνικό Μετσόβιο Πούτεχνείο 
 
 
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 =
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕
𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕
 
 
As almost always the companies under examination use more than one input to produce 
more than one output, the previous ratio transforms into 
 
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 =
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕𝟏 + 𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕𝟐 +  … … .
𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕𝟏 + 𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕𝟐 +   … … .
 
 
 
The next step includes the consideration of some weights that always apply in production 
processes. Usually the weights represent the prices that the company has paid for each input 
and the value of money that the company has made for each output respectively.  
 
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 =
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕𝟏 × 𝒖𝟏 + 𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕𝟐 × 𝒖𝟐 +  … … .
𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕𝟏 × 𝒗𝟏 + 𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕𝟐 × 𝒗𝟐 +  … … .
 
 
where     ui  , i=1,2,… is the weight given to outputi 
               vj   , j=1,2,…  is the weight given to inputj 
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Of course the final form of the ratio is the one where we substituted the total outputs and 
the total inputs with the Value Added and the Capital Employed respectively.  
 
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 =
𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 𝑨𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒅
𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑬𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒐𝒚𝒆𝒅
 
 
The “Value Added” and the “Capital Employed” can be determined in various ways and it 
is usually the examiner the one who decides which features of the financial statement 
should be used to substitute the two terms. During our research we used two different 
models, each of which used 2 input variables and 1 output variable.  
 
5.3 Technical Efficiency-Price Efficiency 
 
Farrel, in his article “The measurement of productive efficiency” (1957), claimed that 
efficiency can be separated into two different concepts: the technical efficiency which 
expresses the unit’s capability to produce the maximum possible output from a certain 
amount of inputs and the price or allocative efficiency which expresses the unit’s capability 
to use the inputs in the optimum combination for a given relation among the prices of the 
inputs.  
Technical Efficiency is the most common efficiency concept as it expresses the conversion 
of physical inputs (such as the services of employees and machines) into outputs relative 
to best practice. In other words, given current technology, there is no wastage of inputs 
whatsoever in producing the given quantity of output. An organization operating at best 
practice is said to be 100% technically efficient (optimal efficiency). If operating below 
best practice levels, then the organization’s technical efficiency is expressed as a 
percentage of best practice. Managerial practices and the scale or size of operations affect 
    
61 
 
technical efficiency, which is based on engineering relationships but not on prices and 
costs. 
On the other hand, price or allocative efficiency refers to whether inputs, for a given level 
of output and set of input prices, are chosen to minimize the cost of production, assuming 
that the organization being examined is already fully technically efficient. Allocative 
efficiency is also expressed as a percentage score, with a score of 100% indicating that the 
organization is using its inputs in the proportions that would minimize costs. An 
organization that is operating at best practice in engineering terms could still be allocatively 
inefficient because it is not using inputs in the proportions which minimize its costs, given 
relative input prices. As a result, allocative efficiency completes technical efficiency as 
part of the overall efficiency of a unit. 
The combination of technical and allocative efficiency in usually referred as cost efficiency. 
y. An organization will only be cost efficient if it is both technically and allocatively 
efficient. Cost efficiency is calculated as the product of the technical and allocative 
efficiency scores (expressed as a percentage), so an organization can only achieve a 100% 
score in cost efficiency if it has achieved 100% in both technical and allocative efficiency 
 
The procedure of valuing a sample of companies each of which uses one or more inputs in 
order to produce one or more outputs is based on Pareto optimality or Pareto efficiency as 
it is also called. According to Pareto optimality an efficient unit can be defined in two 
different ways: 
 An output-oriented approach defines a unit as efficient if it is not possible to 
increase the output without first increasing the inputs 
 An input-oriented approach defines a unit as efficient if it is not possible to decrease 
the use of an input if the output is not to be decreased as well 
In our project, where we compare a number of companies, the above definitions can be 
mathematically defined as below. In the following mathematical expressions y (r=1,…,s) 
represents the outputs and x (i=1,…,m) represents the inputs. 
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 According to an output-oriented approach, a company j0 is efficient if there is no 
other company j, j ≠j0,   for which     yr΄j>yr΄j0  for r΄ and yrj ≥ yrj0  ∀ r ≠ r΄  while 
xij<xij0   ∀ i 
 According to an input-oriented approach, a company j0 is efficient if there is no 
other company j, j ≠j0,      for which    xi΄j<xi΄j0       for i΄ and xij<xij0  ∀ i ≠ i΄ while 
yrj>yrj0   ∀ r 
 
5.4 DEA mathematical model  
 
As explained the model estimates the relative efficiency for each DMU compared to all the 
other units of the sample. According to the simplest model, this is achieved by maximizing 
the ratio of the weighted average output of the unit to the weighted average input of the 
unit.   
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ℎ0 =
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𝑟=1
∑𝑟=1
𝑚   𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖0
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∑𝑟=1
𝑠  𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟0
∑𝑖=1
𝑚   𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖0
≤ 1  ∀ 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 
 
𝑢𝑟 , 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝜀 
 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚  𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠 
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 h0 relative efficiency of DMU  
 0  is the DMU under research of the sample  j=1,…,n  DMUs 
  j  is then number of DMUs   
 r is the number of outputs, r = 1,…,s 
 i is the number of inputs i = 1,…,m 
 yrj is the amount of output r for DMU j 
 xij is the amount of input i for DMU j 
 ε is very small positive number (ε = 10-6) 
 vi , ur are the weight coefficients for input i and output j respectively, that maximize 
the objective function for the DMU that is under research 
 
This model is known as CCR model derived from the initial letters of the names Charles, 
Cooper and Rhodes. It is a non-linear optimization problem that can take linear form after 
modifications. However, it represents in the simplest way possible how the DEA functions. 
The concept is quite simple. A unit, call it j0, chooses certain weight coefficients u, v so 
that the relative efficiency is maximized. The same coefficients are used in the rest of units 
and for each one the relative efficiency is calculated. If no other unit is detected that has 
higher relative efficiency than unit j0, then j0 is efficient; otherwise it is inefficient.  
 
The last non-linear model was transformed to an output-oriented linear model by Charles 
and Banker in 1978. The new mathematical form is given below 9: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑣𝑖 , 𝑢𝑟
ℎ0 = ∑ 𝑢𝑟  𝑦𝑟0
𝑠
𝑟=1
  
𝑠. 𝑡    ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖0
𝑚
𝑖=1
=  1   
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∑ 𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑠
𝑟=1
− ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑖=1
≤ 0 ∀ 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛  
𝑢𝑟 , 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝜀 
𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚     𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠 
 
As it is obvious the concept of this interpretation is different. This time we try to find the 
relative efficiency h0 for each unit compared to the other units. The model detects the 
highest value for h0 by comparing all the inputs and the outputs from all the units, so that 
none calculated h exceeds the value of 1. In more detail, for each unit we determine the 
values for ur and vi, so that these values are used for the calculation of the relative efficiency 
for each other unit. Afterwards, the unit under examination changes and the same procedure 
takes place. This procedure takes place under the limitations set by the model.  
In the whole procedure the inputs and outputs, x and y respectively, are known data while 
u, v are the variables that take numerous values in order to calculate the relative efficiency 
in each step. Since our sample consists of n different units, the method is applied n times 
and we receive n pairs of weight coefficients (u, v) that have been calculated in a way that 
the value of h0 does not exceed 1. Of course the efficiency calculated for each company is 
depending entirely on the chosen sample. If the relative efficiency is h0=1, it does not 
necessarily mean that the unit is efficient, but that the unit under examination has the best 
performance among all the units of the sample. This aforementioned concept is crucial 
concept to DEA. Basic purpose of DEA is not to recognize the most efficient companies, 
but to recognize those companies that could produce the same level of outputs they 
currently do with lower level of inputs or could produce higher level of outputs with the 
current level of inputs.  
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Below we use a graph to describe the procedure (the next graph and the description were 
taken by a DEA tutorial of Chang Jung Christian University that is public) 
 
Figure l shows a set of units P1, P2, ... P6 with each unit consuming the same amount of a 
single resource and producing different amounts of outputs, y1 and y2 as shown. For a 
given amount of resource input, units providing greater amounts of the outputs will be the 
efficient ones. Applying the DEA approach to this set of units will identify units P1, P2, 
P3 and P4 as efficient and they provide an envelope round the entire data set units P5 and 
P6 are within this envelope and are inefficient. The data envelope has been notionally 
extended to the axes by the lines P1y2' and P4y1' to enclose the data set.  
For unit P5 the peer group consists of the units P1 and P2 and a set of targets for P5 is 
provided at P5'. These targets are obtained by a pro rata increase in the outputs of unit P5. 
Clearly there are other possible targets for P5 and for example if the output level Y2 could 
not be increased for P5 then a target P5" could be set which would rely entirely on 
increasing output y1. For unit P6 the pro rata increase leads to the set of targets P6'. 
However P6' is clearly dominated by P4 which produces the same amount of output y1 but 
more output y2. In this case the pro rata increase needs to be supplemented by a further 
increase in the output of y2 to provide an efficient target. Returning to unit P5 the set of 
targets P5 can be obtained from a weighted average of the peer units P1 and P2. Thus P5 
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can be thought of as a composite unit made up of a weighted average of the peer units and 
this composite unit provides a target for the inefficient unit. 
 
The case of economies of scale and returns to scale 
The two mathematical models of DEA we have referred until now have a major 
assumption; this assumption is that we have only constant economies of scale during our 
research. However, since the purpose of DEA is to detect inefficient companies according 
to potential changes in outputs or inputs, it is important to take economies of scale into 
consideration, as well as the returns to scale.  Scale efficiency is a measure inherently 
relating to the returns to scale of a technology at any specific point of the production 
process. Traditionally, it measures how close an observed plant is to the optimal scale 
(Försund and Hjalmarsson, 1979). More precisely, scale efficiency reflects the average 
productivity at the observed input scale with respect to the efficient (optimal) scale 
(Försund, 1996). T 
“Economy of scale” is a microeconomic concept that refers to the cost advantages that 
enterprises might obtain due to size, output or scale of operation. A firm’s efficiency is 
significantly affected by its size. Large firms are often more efficient than small ones 
because they can gain from economies of scale, but firms can become too large and suffer 
from diseconomies of scale. As a firm expands its scale of operations, it is said to move 
into its long run. The benefits arising from expansion depend upon the effect of expansion 
on productive efficiency, which can be assessed by looking at changes in average costs at 
each stage of production.  
“Returns to scale” is another concept that describe the proportional change in the level of 
outputs with respect to proportional change in the level of inputs. In other words, the law 
of returns to scale states that when there is a proportionate change in the amounts of inputs, 
the behavior of output also changes, as in the long run all factors of production are variable 
and subject to change due to a given increase in size (scale). While economies of 
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scale show the effect of an increased output level on unit costs, returns to scale focus on 
the relation between input and output quantities, which is under examination during a DEA.  
According to the models we have described until now, if the all inputs were to increase by 
a factor of 2, the outputs would increase by 2 as well, because the models assume constant 
returns to scale. In the real world however, this is not the case. The scale efficiency is 
crucial when evaluating units of a sample and analysts should take it into consideration. 
For this reason Banker, Charles and Cooper came up with a new model in 1984 which was 
named BCC after the initial letters of their names. The mathematical form of this model is 
described below 9,10: 
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This model inserts a new variable which is ω0. Specifically, this variable acts as an index 
of scale efficiency, which depicts increasing economy of a scale for a company if ω0 > 0, 
decreasing economy of scale if ω0 < 0 and constant economy of scale if ω0 =0. 
The CCR model provides an efficiency outcome which is usually called overall efficiency 
because it consists of two separate concepts that were discussed earlier. These are technical 
efficiency and price or allocative efficiency. One DMU can present maximum efficiency 
when both technical and allocative efficiency are maximum.  
 
5.5 DEA in practice 
 
In practice DEA is implemented with the help of numerous software packages that process 
all the data that have been inserted. The first packages, that were created, presented some 
problems regarding the process of negative data such as negative value added. This is a 
very common phenomenon in our research because many shipping companies had higher 
operating costs than revenues for a number of years.  
For this reason we used two different software packages during our study. The first was 
MaxDEA Basic version 6.13. This package presented no problem during the 
implementation of first DEA model that we created, but during the second model, where 
many output values were negative. it would not work. For this reason, a second software 
package was used whose name was OSDEA version 1.3.0.  Both packages are distributed 
freely in the Internet.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Valuation Results and Analysis 
 
6.1 Results of tanker market 
6.1.1 Results of EVA 
 
In this section we present the outcomes obtained by the “Economic Value Added” method 
for both dry bulk market and wet market. For each company we used the official documents 
published by the companies, which is the 20-F form. According to SEC (Securities and 
Exchange Commission), each foreign private issuer with listed equity shares on exchanges 
in USA is required to submit this form at the end of each year so that investors can evaluate 
these investments.  The information requirements for 20-F form are not as strict as the 
requirements for domestic U.S. companies that make regular filings, but the essential 
information for the calculation of EVA are included in this form either it issued by a 
domestic U.S public company or a foreign public company.   In previous chapter we 
explained in detail what information is needed for the implementation of EVA method. 
The goal of the mandatory use of 20-F forms is to standardize the form of the info provided, 
so that any potential bias among the calculations is eliminated. Of course, the full 
elimination is not possible, so further adjustments and changes during our research were 
necessary.  
During our research we calculated the EVA for each company from 2006 to 2015. 
Although the main topic of our project is the study of the performance of maritime 
companies during periods of low freight rates, we decided to expand the range of our 
research in order to observe, if possible, other fluctuations in the performance of shipping 
companies. So before we focus on periods where the market experienced a heavy downturn 
we have included two tables that show the calculated EVA for each company for each year 
and the difference from year to year.  
Furthermore, we decided to calculate the aggregated EVA for all companies from 2006 to 
2015 and see if the industry as a whole performed poorly during the periods indicated from 
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the indexes. As indicated in table 1, the industry as a whole did perform worse than any 
other year during these years.  
The empty cells indicate that no data was found for the company either because the 
company provided no data for the year or because the company was still private at the time 
and consequently had no obligation to publish its financial statements.  
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COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME     -49,587 -41,947 -49,098 -117,118 -80,045 -13,224 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS  -11,666 22,407 -14,928 -29,782 22,639 -71,798 33,218 -24,099 -27,335 
DHT HOLDINGS 2,858 8,977 13,534 -9,990 -13,624 -61,499 -109,205 -21,103 -48,742 42,810 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS -5,821 -29,526 72,432 -45,735 -55,332 -127,071 -115,621 -142,626 -53,534 77,112 
SCORPIO TANKERS    -1,619 -21,753 -95,649 -46,383 -31,209 -54,151 112,579 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 52,366 59,360 145,314 -47,558 -61,322 -168,313 -131,462 -144,345 -83,091 14,887 
FRONTLINE LTD 623,600 351,051 738,315 163,949 819,810 846,594 -29,963 -135,166 -883 207,774 
TEEKAY TANKERS 17,178 18,450 61,792 15,925 -9,558 -39,346 -374,782 -24,495 14,003 83,413 
CONCORDIA MARITIME     -11,276 -12,598 -8,644 -17,696 -7,723 8,151 
TORM 144,706 51,158 429,048 158,550 94,772 -378 -164,747 85,654 19,406 156,741 
FIRST SHIP LEASE  -48,135 -33,643 -8,137 -18,409 -33,942 -15,604 -70,141 -12,267 -4,027 
TOTAL 834,889 399,669 1,449,199 210,458 643,937 288,491 -1,117,307 -585,027 -331,127 658,882 
DIFFERENCE FROM  
 ONE YEAR BEFORE  -52.13% 262.60% -85.48% 205.97% -55.20% -487.29% 47.64% 43.40% 298.98% 
 
Table 1. Economic Value Added for each company separately and aggregated for all the companies together from 2006 to 2015 
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COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - - - - 15% -17% -139% 32% 83% 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS - - 292% -167% -100% 176% -417% 146% -173% -13% 
DHT HOLDINGS - 214% 51% -174% -36% -351% -78% 81% -131% 188% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS - -407% 345% -163% -21% -130% 9% -23% 62% 244% 
SCORPIO TANKERS - - - - -1244% -340% 52% 33% -74% 308% 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION - 13% 145% -133% -29% -174% 22% -10% 42% 118% 
FRONTLINE LTD - -44% 110% -78% 400% 3% -104% -351% 99% 23635% 
TEEKAY TANKERS - 7% 235% -74% -160% -312% -853% 93% 157% 496% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - - - - -12% 31% -105% 56% 206% 
TORM - -65% 739% -63% -40% -100% -43534% 152% -77% 708% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE - - 30% 76% -126% -84% 54% -350% 83% 67% 
 
Table 2. Difference of Economic Value Added from year to year from 2006 to 2015 
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1st period:2008-2010 
As has been explained in previous chapter, the first big fall in freight rates is noted in 2009. 
That year the average price of the Baltic Dirty Tanker Index declined sharply by 61.14% 
from 1498.83 points in 2008 to 582.42 points in 2009. Similarly the Baltic Clean Tanker 
Index plunged by 57.33% reaching an average of 490 points for 2009 while the average 
price for 2008 was 1149.  
The table 4 shows the fluctuations of the calculated EVA. We have calculated the percent 
difference of EVA for the first year of low freight rates and one year after. In this way we 
try to show the impact of low spot prices to future revenues. To be more precise, the low 
spot prices influence the price of time-charter contracts in a negative for the shipping 
company way, because the term-charter contracts fall. As a result, the companies report 
low revenues and the calculated EVA fall. This phenomenon is obvious not only in table 
4, but also in the first table of our presentation (table 1), where lower value of aggregated 
EVA is noted not only in the year of the sharp decrease, but also one year, or in some 
occasions two years afterwards.  
The companies in green shading are the three largest companies in our sample for the 
period 2008-2010. We classify the companies by “size” by calculating the fixed assets of 
each company. We decided to use the fixed assets and not the total assets of each company 
because the value of fixed assets is a better of the fleet employed by the company to 
produce the revenues reported. That happens because the total assets includes the value of 
the current assets that might distort the real value of the company if the managers of the 
company has accumulated too much cash compared to other companies. Since this project 
focuses on evaluating companies according to their operational activities and considers all 
the operational values such as operational profit, operational revenues, fixed assets, it 
would be wrong to compare other measures than the strictly operational. In addition, 
maritime companies do invest usually in derivative products to manage their financial risk 
and the value of these products is usually calculated in current assets. Fixed assets, on the 
other hand, represent in most cases the closest value to the value of the vessels and for our 
purpose, which is the operational evaluation of the companies, this value is more useful. 
The value of fixed assets as obtained by the 20-F forms is given in table 3. 
    
75 
  
COMPANY 2008 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 641,607.00 
DHT HOLDINGS 462,387.00 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 740,631.00 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 2,209,317.00 
FRONTLINE LTD 2,100,717.00 
TEEKAY TANKERS 522,796.00 
TORM 2,235,863.00 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 845,187.00 
Table 3. Fixed Assets for each company in 2008 
 
COMPANY 
difference         
2009-2008 
difference     
2010-2008 
NAVIOS MARITIME -  -  
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS -166.62% -232.92% 
DHT HOLDINGS -173.81% -200.67% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS -163.14% -176.39% 
SCORPIO TANKERS -   - 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION -132.73% -142.20% 
FRONTLINE LTD -77.79% 11.04% 
TEEKAY TANKERS -74.23% -115.47% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME  - -  
TORM -63.05% -77.91% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 75.81% 45.28% 
Table 4. Economic Value Added fluctuations from 2008 to 2010 
 
COMPANY 2008 2009 2010 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - 9 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 6 7 8 
DHT HOLDINGS 7 6 5 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 4 8 10 
SCORPIO TANKERS - - 7 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 3 9 11 
FRONTLINE LTD 1 1 1 
TEEKAY TANKERS 5 3 6 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - 4 
TORM 2 2 2 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 8 5 6 
Table 5. Company rankings according to EVA from 2008 to 2010 
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As can be seen in table 4, even big companies report significantly lower results during 
periods of low freight rates, despite the size of their fleet. Although two of the three biggest 
companies showed relatively better performance than the other companies for 2009, 
Tsakos Energy Foundation   reported a highly negative value for 2009. Although, there are 
other companies that report similarly negative results, Tsakos Energy Navigation stands 
out because it was the only one of the big companies that could not bounce back in 2010. 
From classification table 5, it is obvious how much TEN was influenced by the crisis as it 
dropped from the 3rd position in 2008 to 9th position in 2009 and to 11th position in 2010, 
which is the last position among the rest of the companies for 2010. Torm followed more 
or less the same pattern with TEN, however Torm never reported negative EVA as TEN 
did already from 2009. As far as the other companies are concerned, the chart 2   illustrates 
the decline they experienced during this period with the exception of First Ship Lease 
which, however, reported steadily negative results. Frontline did not perform poorly during 
this period of crisis as it never reported negative EVA, being the only company to achieve 
that.   
 
Chart 1. EVA from 2008 to 2011-Large companies 
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Chart 2. EVA from 2008 to 2011-Small companies 
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2nd period: 2011-2013 
The choice of the next period we should study was more complicated because the two 
indexes (Clean and Dirty Tanker) declined during different periods.  The Baltic Dirty 
Tanker Index declined in 2011 when it reached an average of 787 points from 886 in 2010, 
while the Baltic Clean Tanker Index  declined by 13% in 2012 reaching an average of 647 
points from 747 points in 2011. In order to decide which year we should consider the 
starting year of recession we used the table 1, where we had calculated the aggregate for 
all the companies together. As explained in previous paragraph the choice then became 
obvious as the EVA of 2012 was significantly lower than that of 2011. In particular, it was 
the first year from 2006 that the aggregate EVA was negative.  The procedure we followed 
during this period was the same as previous, however, now the sample was greater and the 
classification different. Before the tables with the outcome of our research we include 
Table 6 which illustrates the new classification, according to the fixed assets of each 
company in 2011. As previously, the names of large companies are located in green cells.  
 
COMPANY 2011 
NAVIOS MARITIME   1,019,000.00  
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS   1,073,986.00  
DHT HOLDINGS       454,542.00  
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS   1,022,793.00  
SCORPIO TANKERS       322,457.00  
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION   2,231,996.00  
FRONTLINE LTD   1,334,512.00  
TEEKAY TANKERS       716,567.00  
CONCORDIA MARITIME       477,050.00  
TORM   2,258,550.00  
FIRST SHIP LEASE       784,696.00  
Table 6. Fixed Assets for each company in 2011 
 
 
Unlike the previous period we studied, during the period 2011-2013 the majority of the 
companies did not follow a specific trend but they hovered around the EVA they have 
achieved one year before the fall in freight rates. For 2012 all companies reported negative 
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EVA as a result of the fall in freight rates. It is worth mentioning, though, that the calculated 
EVA was already negative for most of the companies for year 2011, as the market had not 
never fully recovered from the crisis of 2009. Considering that the two indexes never 
returned to the level that they were before 2009, this is phenomenon was expected as the 
revenues of the companies never managed to fully recovered.   So even the increase in 
some EVAs from 2011 to 2012 or to 2013 depict a decrease in losses and not an actual 
increase of value.  Only two companies, Capital Product Tankers and Torm, achieved a 
positive EVA in 2013.  
Another interesting fact illustrated in table 7 and in charts 3 and 4 is the fact that most of 
the companies had different many fluctuations from 2011 to 2013 as far as its EVA is 
concerned. That’s an indication that the managers of the companies were more prepared 
for a potential downfall than they were back in 2009 and they followed different strategies. 
Of course, that is completely logical if we consider that in 2011 the indexes hovered around 
750 points, while in 2008 the indexes hovered around 1500 points. The low freight rates 
must have kept the owners in alert in case of another crisis as the damage would be greater 
this time, because of the highly negative results.  
Table 8 highlights the volatile environment that the market has been experiencing during 
this period. We can see that the classification has changed a number of times, but the most 
interesting fact is that this time we have many shifts and usually long shifts for all the 
companies regardless of their size.  
COMPANY 
difference            
2012-2011 
difference      
2013-2011 
NAVIOS MARITIME -17.05% -179.21% 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS -417.14% 46.73% 
DHT HOLDINGS -77.57% 65.69% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 9.01% -12.24% 
SCORPIO TANKERS 51.51% 67.37% 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 21.89% 14.24% 
FRONTLINE LTD -103.54% -115.97% 
TEEKAY TANKERS -852.54% 37.74% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME 31.38% -40.47% 
TORM -43534.25% 22786.12% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 54.03% -106.65% 
Table 7. Economic Value Added fluctuations from 2011 to 2013 
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COMPANY 2011 2012 2013 
NAVIOS MARITIME 7 5 8 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 2 6 2 
DHT HOLDINGS 8 7 4 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 10 8 10 
SCORPIO TANKERS 9 4 6 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 11 9 11 
FRONTLINE LTD 1 3 9 
TEEKAY TANKERS 6 11 5 
CONCORDIA MARITIME 4 1 3 
TORM 3 10 1 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 5 2 7 
Table 8. Company rankings according to EVA from 2011 to 2013 
 
 
Chart 3. EVA from 2011 to 2014-Large companies 
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Chart 4. EVA from 2011to 2014-Small companies 
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6.1.2 Results of Altman Z - Score 
 
The procedure described in the previous paragraph for the evaluation of shipping 
companies with EVA is the same we followed for the evaluation with Altman Z-score. We 
calculated the Altman Z-score for all the companies from 2006 to 2015 but for detailed 
analysis we focused on terms 2008-2010 and 2011-2013, when the indexes experienced 
the biggest declines as has been described.  
Unlike EVA, that highlighted the poor performance of the industry during 2009, 2011 and 
the years afterwards, Z-score could not illustrate the poor performance of the industry or 
even of each company separately. That happened for two main reasons.  The first has to do 
with the fact that since the ratios have different coefficients and the companies do business 
in a highly volatile environment, where the revenues can deviate way more than in other 
industries, the potential decrease in one ratio with a low coefficient can match a potential 
increase in another ratio with a high coefficient. For example, when the company reports 
low Earnings Before Interest Taxes (EBIT) and the ratio EBIT to Assets falls, an increase 
in working capital or a decrease in assets can manipulate the Z-score. Another issue is the 
volatile environment of maritime business. Altman Z-score formula is more suitable for 
companies that present a stability as far as their operation is concerned, a situation 
completely different than the one that maritime companies have to deal with. Maritime 
environment demands instant decision-making and constant evaluation of the condition of 
the market before apply a particular strategy. So except the volatility in revenues and 
earnings, the assets, the retained earnings, the market value of equity fluctuate irregularly 
based on the strategy that the managers follow. In this situation Z-score cannot predict 
financial distress as it would in other occasions where the companies examined present 
more stable financial data.  
As explained in previous chapter due to the high leveraged companies that we study we 
expected very low Z-scores. However, what we wanted to examine from the beginning of 
the project was not the values for each year separately but the fluctuations from year to 
year. Besides, especially in maritime business the prediction of bankruptcy is tough.  Since 
shipping tends to be cyclical, investors comprehend that their investors will experience 
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many low points as well as many high points. So investors, lenders and creditors usually 
show patience before they dumped their shares. Creditors and lenders, who usually are the 
ones who provoke a bankruptcy, have in many occasions extend the payback period of the 
companies so that companies have the time to find and apply new strategies in order to 
lower their debt.  Of course, that kind of situations, although very common in business 
world, cannot be predicted by Z-score. That is the reason Z-score cannot be considered as 
a reliable indication of financial distress in maritime but only as a measure to compare 
different companies.  
Since we could not reach safe conclusions by the analysis of the fluctuations of Z-score, 
we tried to examine the ranking table for each period and see if there is a pattern from year 
to year for the companies examined. As we will explain in the next pages, Z-score tends to 
give more stable results in the rank of the companies than EVA did. Further analysis for 
that data will be given in next paragraphs.         
Starting from the first period, 2008-2011, table 10 illustrates that during the years of low 
freight rates there were not big changes in the companies’ rankings.  Regardless of their 
size, the companies did not show large shifts from their initial position in 2008.   The 
biggest shift was noted for three companies:  Tsakos Energy Navigation, Torm and First 
Ship Lease that shifted from 5th, 6th and 8th place to 8th, 9th and 11th place respectively.  
The most striking feature of the table, however, is that the top 4 teams for all 3 years were 
the same 4 with some changes of positions. These top 4 companies were Nordic American 
Tankers, Frontline Ltd, Teekay Tankers and   DHT Holdings. 
During the next term we observe a similar picture as most of the companies did not 
experience large shifts. The only exceptions were Scorpio Tankers and Concordia 
Maritime.  Scorpio Tankers improved   impressively its Z-score (compared to other 
companies) as it climbed from 8th place in 2011 to 2nd place in 2013.  On the hand, 
Concordia Maritime lost   5 positions falling from the 4th place in 2011 to 9th in 2013. 
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COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME     0.25 0.39 0.42 0.60 0.76 0.78 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS  1.02 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.54 1.07 1.34 1.23 1.09 
DHT HOLDINGS 14.08 8.22 4.72 4.63 6.57 0.07 -0.16 0.80 0.75 1.34 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 2.83 4.79 27.41 63.71 8.24 1.29 0.93 1.36 2.24 2.77 
SCORPIO TANKERS    0.41 0.90 0.24 1.39 4.85 0.76 0.74 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 1.38 1.43 1.22 0.91 0.74 0.44 0.43 0.50 0.65 0.95 
FRONTLINE LTD 11.75 17.37 11.85 12.89 10.55 2.70 2.57 5.72 4.97 3.74 
TEEKAY TANKERS 0.91 2.29 1.28 1.24 1.07 0.76 -0.33 0.72 1.05 1.00 
CONCORDIA MARITIME     0.78 0.75 0.23 0.49 0.50 0.70 
TORM 6.32 2.62 1.16 0.76 0.38 -0.69 0.08 0.45 0.69 0.25 
FIRST SHIP LEASE  0.11 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.07 -0.97 0.16 0.24 
TOTAL 37.26 37.85 48.69 85.61 30.53 6.54 6.71 15.85 13.76 13.60 
DIFFERENCE FROM ONE YEAR BEFORE  1.58% 28.63% 75.83% -64.33% -78.58% 2.53% 136.29% -13.20% -1.14% 
 
Table 9. Altman Z-score for each company separately and aggregated for all the companies together from 2006 to 2015 
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COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - - - - 55.60% 7.12% 41.43% 27.44% 3.10% 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS - - -9.49% -0.96% 4.53% -43.23% 97.59% 24.75% -8.07% -11.09% 
DHT HOLDINGS - -41.65% -42.59% -1.88% 41.89% -98.99% -340.26% 602.54% -6.92% 78.77% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS - 69.50% 472.07% 132.42% -87.06% -84.40% -27.94% 46.28% 65.27% 23.52% 
SCORPIO TANKERS - - - - 120.10% -72.93% 470.87% 248.46% -84.42% -2.04% 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION - 4.12% -14.75% -25.69% -18.61% -41.05% -1.87% 16.90% 31.11% 45.44% 
FRONTLINE LTD - 47.84% -31.77% 8.78% -18.19% -74.38% -4.72% 122.12% -13.08% -24.80% 
TEEKAY TANKERS - 150.73% -43.98% -3.30% -13.45% -29.20% -143.37% 318.32% 45.90% -4.39% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - - - - -3.77% -69.06% 110.94% 2.02% 39.84% 
TORM - -58.52% -55.78% -34.85% -49.69% -281.50% 111.15% 487.76% 53.63% -64.02% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE - - 6.28% 22.42% -33.37% -46.75% 37.55% -1432.49% 116.13% 52.40% 
 
Table 10. Difference Altman Z-score from year to year from 2006 to 2015 
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1st period: 2008-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Z-score fluctuations from 2008 to 2010 
 
 
COMPANY 2008 2009 2010 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - 10 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 7 5 5 
DHT HOLDINGS 3 3 3 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 1 1 2 
SCORPIO TANKERS - 8 6 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 5 6 8 
FRONTLINE LTD 2 2 1 
TEEKAY TANKERS 4 4 4 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - 7 
TORM 6 7 9 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 8 9 11 
Table 12. Company rankings according to Z-score from 2008 to 2010 
 
 
 
 
COMPANY 
difference         
2009-2008 
difference     
2010-2008 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS -0.96% 3.53% 
DHT HOLDINGS -1.88% 39.22% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 132.42% -69.93% 
SCORPIO TANKERS - - 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION -25.69% -39.52% 
FRONTLINE LTD 8.78% -11.01% 
TEEKAY TANKERS -3.30% -16.31% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - 
TORM -34.85% -67.22% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 22.42% -18.43% 
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Chart 5. Z-score from 2008 to 2011-Large companies 
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Chart 6. Z-score from 2008 to 2011-Small companies 
 
 
2nd period: 2011-2013 
 
COMPANY 
difference            
2012-2011 
difference      
2013-2011 
NAVIOS MARITIME 7.12% 51.51% 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 97.59% 146.50% 
DHT HOLDINGS -340.26% 1107.41% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS -27.94% 5.41% 
SCORPIO TANKERS 470.87% 1889.25% 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION -1.87% 14.71% 
FRONTLINE LTD -4.72% 111.63% 
TEEKAY TANKERS -143.37% -5.32% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME -69.06% -34.74% 
TORM 111.15% 165.51% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 37.55% -1932.84% 
Table 13. Z-score fluctuations from 2011 to 2013 
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COMPANY 2011 2012 2013 
NAVIOS MARITIME 7 6 7 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 5 3 4 
DHT HOLDINGS 9 10 5 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 2 4 3 
SCORPIO TANKERS 8 2 2 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 6 5 8 
FRONTLINE LTD 1 1 1 
TEEKAY TANKERS 3 11 6 
CONCORDIA MARITIME 4 7 9 
TORM 11 8 10 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 10 9 11 
Table 14. Company rankings according to Z-score from 2011 to 2013 
 
 
 
Chart 7. Z-score from 2011 to 2014-Large companies 
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Chart 8. Z-score from 2011 to 2014-Small companies 
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6.1.3 Results of 1st model of DEA 
 
As explained during the DEA valuation we used two models. The first model is an input-
oriented model that focuses on how much inputs of a company can be reduced without 
affecting the outputs. Its target is to examine the efficiency of the shipping companies as 
far as the income creation is concerned.  
During the analysis we used three items from the balance sheet. As input units we used 
“assets” and “operating cost” as they are defined in the balance sheet and the income 
statement respectively. On the other hand, as output we used the “revenues”. As has been 
explained from the beginning of this project we evaluate the strictly shipping procedures 
of each company, which means that each value refers to shipping business. To elaborate, 
as “assets”, we used the “fixed assets” as reported by each company and as “revenues” we 
used only the revenues that came from chartering. Revenues is the first item reported by 
each company in the beginning of the income statement, however, it should be mentioned 
that shipping companies might have revenues from other sources that should be excluded 
for the purpose of this project. For example, all shipping companies use derivative 
products, such as swaps, that, in case it is profitable, they are sold. Any profit or revenue 
coming from this activity should not be added in the “revenues” used as an output during 
this study. As far as the operating cost is concerned we used the value as reported in income 
statement for each company without any adjustments.   
For the results obtained by this method we calculated the standard deviation, a measure 
that we did not include in the analysis of the results obtained by the previous methods. This 
measure is used to quantify the amount of variation or dispersion of the results. In the 
results of the previous methods we could not use this measure to reach any conclusion as 
the size effect of each company influenced significantly the final result in both EVA and 
Z-score calculations for various reasons. As will explained in the next paragraphs the 
calculation of standard deviation led us to some safe conclusions.  
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COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME         100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 97.16% 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS   100.00% 92.79% 88.51% 100.00% 74.10% 76.09% 71.42% 63.33% 53.74% 
DHT HOLDINGS 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 82.76% 94.54% 62.46% 51.61% 71.44% 53.12% 71.63% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 86.73% 81.21% 93.52% 48.19% 67.90% 34.96% 52.37% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
SCORPIO TANKERS       100.00% 66.13% 50.61% 72.76% 64.34% 55.97% 100.00% 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 100.00% 100.00% 94.59% 79.06% 91.90% 68.69% 81.20% 69.91% 100.00% 78.00% 
FRONTLINE LTD 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 84.75% 86.97% 76.59% 100.00% 61.05% 
TEEKAY TANKERS 100.00% 100.00% 94.20% 100.00% 89.66% 100.00% 37.69% 70.22% 67.51% 78.56% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME         100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
TORM 52.91% 82.90% 100.00% 100.00% 95.87% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 96.41% 100.00% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE   100.00% 83.93% 72.91% 80.49% 56.62% 84.98% 49.00% 54.45% 53.41% 
AVERAGE 89.94% 95.51% 94.88% 85.71% 89.68% 75.65% 76.70% 79.36% 80.98% 81.23% 
STANDARD DEVIATION 17.25% 7.78% 5.07% 16.50% 12.08% 22.00% 20.41% 16.94% 20.55% 18.36% 
DIFFERENCE FROM ONE YEAR BEFORE   6.20% -0.66% -9.66% 4.63% -15.64% 1.38% 3.47% 2.05% 0.31% 
 
Table 16. Efficiency scores for each company separately and relevant statistics for all the companies together from 2006 to 2015 
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COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME  - - - - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -2.84% 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS  - -7.21% -4.61% 12.98% -25.90% 2.69% -6.14% -11.33% -15.14% 
DHT HOLDINGS  0.00% 0.00% -17.24% 14.23% -33.93% -17.37% 38.42% -25.64% 34.85% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS  -6.36% 15.16% -48.47% 40.90% -48.51% 49.80% 90.95% 0.00% 0.00% 
SCORPIO TANKERS  - - - -33.87% -23.47% 43.77% -11.57% -13.01% 78.67% 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION  0.00% -5.41% -16.42% 16.24% -25.26% 18.21% -13.90% 43.04% -22.00% 
FRONTLINE LTD  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -15.25% 2.62% -11.94% 30.57% -38.95% 
TEEKAY TANKERS  0.00% -5.80% 6.16% -10.34% 11.53% -62.31% 86.31% -3.86% 16.37% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME  - - - - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
TORM  56.68% 20.63% 0.00% -4.13% 4.31% 0.00% 0.00% -3.59% 3.72% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE  - -16.07% -13.13% 10.40% -29.66% 50.09% -42.34% 11.12% -1.91% 
 
Table 17. Efficiency scores’ fluctuations from year to year from 2006 to 2015 
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1st period: 2008-2010 
Starting from the first 3-year period, the industry average performance has obviously 
decreased from 94.88% in 2008 to 85.71% in 2009 before recover a bit in 2010 to reach 
89.68%. That’s the second biggest decrease during the 10-year period we examined 2.  
Another interesting fact is the change in the calculated standard deviation. For fiscal year 
2008 the standard deviation was 5.07%, the lowest during the period 2006-2015. From 
2011, however, the standard deviation is always over 10%, depicting the dispersion of the 
results of DEA. For 2008 there was no company with result under 80% while in 2009 3 
shipping companies achieved result under 80%. One of them, Nordic American Tankers, 
reported a record low of 48.19%, too. For 2010 the performance was clearly improved as 
from the enhanced sample of 11 companies only two were under the 80% and the industry 
average increased by 4.63% to reach 89.68%.  Overall, we can say that with the exception 
of Torm and Teekay Tankers, all companies bounced back during 2010. This is clearly 
illustrated in table 18 as well as in charts 7, 8.  
 
 
COMPANY difference         
2009-2008 
difference     
2010-2008 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS -4.61% 7.77% 
DHT HOLDINGS -17.24% -5.46% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS -48.47% -27.40% 
SCORPIO TANKERS - - 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION -16.42% -2.84% 
FRONTLINE LTD 0.00% 0.00% 
TEEKAY TANKERS 6.16% -4.82% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - 
TORM 0.00% -4.13% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE -13.13% -4.10% 
Table 18. 1st DEA model fluctuations from 2008 to 2010 
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COMPANY 2008 2009 2010 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - 1 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 7 5 2 
DHT HOLDINGS 1 6 6 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 6 9 10 
SCORPIO TANKERS - 1 11 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 4 7 7 
FRONTLINE LTD 2 2 3 
TEEKAY TANKERS 5 3 8 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - 4 
TORM 3 4 5 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 8 8 9 
Table 19. Company rankings according to 1st DEA model from 2008 to 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
110.00%
2008 2009 2010 2011
2008-large companies
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION FRONTLINE LTD TORM
    
96 
  
Chart 7. 1st DEA model from 2008 to 2011-Large companies 
 
 
 
Chart 8. 1st DEA model from 2008 to 2011-Small companies 
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2nd period: 2011-2013 
Unlike other methods, the 1st model of DEA did not give the excepted results for the second 
3-year period we examined. To be more specific, the outcomes for 2012 and 2013 were not 
lower than these for 2011, a phenomenon that we had not detected when used EVA as 
valuation method (or Z-score). As indicated by table 16 the industry average was almost 
the same in 2011 and 2012 (75.65 % and 76.7 % respectively) as well as the calculated 
standard deviation for each year. Table 20 illustrates mixed movements for each one of the 
11 companies we have concluded in the sample. Many companies seem to have delivered 
steady positive results (Concordia Maritime, Torm, Navios Maritime), but the rest of the 
companies experienced either positive or negative movements in their efficiency scores. 
After further research about the low scores for 2011, we reached the conclusion that this 
distortion in our data was created by the increased operating costs that all shipping 
companies reported for 2011. These data can be found in table A.8 of appendix. It is 
obvious that in 2011 and 2012 all companies reported increased operating costs compared 
to the costs of 2009 and 2010. Moreover, the average operating cost for both 2011 and 
2012 just surpassed the 300,000. That had not happened for 3 years; since 2008, just before 
the first big fall of freight rates. Of course the difference is that back then in 2008 the 
indexes fluctuated around 1500 points, while now the indexes hovered around 600 points, 
so the revenues are significantly lower and the companies cannot be as effective as they 
were in 2008. That’s the reason DEA has not performed for this period. Of course, it is 
important to mention that the previous methods could not detect that phenomenon. Here, 
in the first model of DEA where we use operating costs as input, it is easier to see the 
impact of the high operating costs. According to sources found in the Internet (mostly 
articles and interviews with shipping experts) the basic reasons for this rise were the 
increased crew cost, the rising cost of lubricants, maintenance and spare parts and increased 
cost of insurance. The modifications that many propulsion systems had to undergo during 
this period might have had an impact as well. 
 
 
    
98 
  
COMPANY difference            
2012-2011 
difference      
2013-2011 
NAVIOS MARITIME 0.00% 0.00% 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 2.69% -3.62% 
DHT HOLDINGS -17.37% 14.38% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 49.80% 186.04% 
SCORPIO TANKERS 43.77% 27.13% 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 18.21% 1.78% 
FRONTLINE LTD 2.62% -9.63% 
TEEKAY TANKERS -62.31% -29.78% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME 0.00% 0.00% 
TORM 0.00% 0.00% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 50.09% -13.46% 
Table 20. 1st DEA model fluctuations from 2011 to 2013 
 
COMPANY 2011 2012 2013 
NAVIOS MARITIME 1 1 1 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 6 7 7 
DHT HOLDINGS 8 10 6 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 11 9 2 
SCORPIO TANKERS 10 8 10 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 7 6 9 
FRONTLINE LTD 5 4 5 
TEEKAY TANKERS 2 11 8 
CONCORDIA MARITIME 3 2 3 
TORM 4 3 4 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 9 5 11 
Table 21. Company rankings according to 1st DEA model from 2011 to 2013 
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Chart 9. 1st DEA model from 2011 to 2014-Large companies 
 
 
Chart 10. 1st DEA model from 2011to 2014 - Small companies 
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6.1.4 Results of 2nd model of DEA 
 
The second model of DEA we used was similar to the first model in terms of orientation 
and number of data used. We used again an input-oriented model where we had two input 
units and one output unit. However, this model was more specific than the previous and 
examined the efficiency of shipping companies  by evaluating the ability to make profit as 
a result of the utilization of the ships. 
To be more specific, we used as input the value of the vessels and the operating cost of the 
vessels, while the output unit for this model was the gross profit created. All the units used 
in this model are subunits of the units used in the first DEA model. In order to obtain the 
necessary data we used the balance sheet and the income statement published by each 
company for the 10-year period 2006-2015, as we have done for the rest of the project. In 
this model, however, there were some occasions where we should make some adjustments 
or further calculations before we obtained the necessary values.  
As far as the results are concerned, in some cases this model produced results of almost 
0% efficiency because some companies reported losses instead of profit for a number of 
years.     
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COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME     99.65% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 75.66% 68.75% 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS  100.00% 69.26% 77.69% 100.00% 43.45% 6.09% 41.26% 31.54% 24.47% 
DHT HOLDINGS 100.00% 84.45% 100.00% 68.40% 73.89% 0.72% 0.99% 4.89% 13.22% 46.39% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 83.38% 57.24% 76.76% 16.74% 1.46% 0.33% 0.32% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
SCORPIO TANKERS    24.29% 5.35% 1.02% 0.77% 38.33% 26.48% 100.00% 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 100.00% 100.00% 50.56% 20.30% 34.31% 0.15% 1.10% 2.53% 14.96% 26.09% 
FRONTLINE LTD 100.00% 98.98% 100.00% 78.34% 100.00% 0.25% 0.26% 0.29% 0.22% 58.34% 
TEEKAY TANKERS 84.64% 100.00% 75.67% 100.00% 65.58% 100.00% 0.35% 17.31% 32.55% 35.61% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME     100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
TORM 45.69% 81.90% 100.00% 58.30% 100.00% 25.43% 100.00% 100.00% 42.56% 50.19% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE  43.79% 55.83% 100.00% 73.34% 6.43% 56.05% 0.66% 22.87% 19.67% 
AVERAGE 85.62% 83.30% 78.51% 60.45% 68.51% 34.34% 33.27% 45.93% 41.82% 57.23% 
Standard Deviation 19.24% 20.39% 18.63% 30.99% 36.50% 42.22% 43.70% 42.95% 32.99% 29.71% 
DIFFERENCE FROM ONE YEAR BEFORE  -2.71% -5.74% -23.00% 13.33% -49.87% -3.14% 38.08% -8.95% 36.83% 
 
Table 22. Efficiency scores for each company separately and aggregated for all the companies together from 2006 to 2015 
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COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME  - - - - 0.35% 0.00% 0.00% -24.34% -9.13% 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS  - -30.74% 12.17% 28.72% -56.55% -85.98% 577.50% -23.56% -22.42% 
DHT HOLDINGS  -15.55% 18.41% -31.60% 8.03% -99.03% 37.50% 393.94% 170.35% 250.92% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS  -31.35% 34.10% -78.19% -91.28% -77.40% -3.03% 31150.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
SCORPIO TANKERS  - - - -77.97% -80.93% -24.51% 4877.92% -30.92% 277.64% 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION  0.00% -49.44% -59.85% 69.01% -99.56% 633.33% 130.00% 491.30% 74.38% 
FRONTLINE LTD  -1.02% 1.03% -21.66% 27.65% -99.75% 4.00% 11.54% -24.14% 26419.01% 
TEEKAY TANKERS  18.15% -24.33% 32.15% -34.42% 52.49% -99.65% 4845.71% 88.04% 9.40% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME  - - - - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
TORM  79.25% 22.10% -41.70% 71.53% -74.57% 293.24% 0.00% -57.44% 17.93% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE  - 27.49% 79.12% -26.66% -91.23% 771.70% -98.82% 3365.15% -13.99% 
 
Table 23. Efficiency scores’ fluctuations from year to year from 2006 to 2015 
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1st period: 2008-2010 
The table 22 indicates the obvious reduction in the efficiency of the companies and the 
industry as a whole. Compared to 2008, in 2009 the industry performed poorly as its 
efficiency score fell 60.45 % from 78.51%. All companies saw a fall in their efficiency 
scores except from Capital Product Tankers, Teekay Tankers and First Ship Lease that 
managed to deliver efficient results. The following year, in 2010, the average score of the 
industry increased to 68%, as most companies managed to recover partially and achieved 
efficient results. There were, however, some companies, such as Nordic American Tankers 
and Scorpio Tankers, which delivered single figure results for the first time. Of course, we 
should mention that Scorpio Tankers had been a “new” public company at the time as its 
initial public offering took place the same year. Usually companies that have just gone 
public and get access to more funding struggle for  a period of time, before they manage to 
deliver solid results.  
 
 
COMPANY 
difference         
2009-
2008 
difference     
2010-2008 
NAVIOS MARITIME   
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 12.17% 44.38% 
DHT HOLDINGS -31.60% -26.11% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS -78.19% -98.10% 
SCORPIO TANKERS   
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION -59.85% -32.14% 
FRONTLINE LTD -21.66% 0.00% 
TEEKAY TANKERS 32.15% -13.33% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME   
TORM -41.70% 0.00% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 79.12% 31.36% 
Table 24. 2nd DEA model fluctuations from 2008 to 2010 
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COMPANY 2008 2009 2010 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - 5 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 6 4 1 
DHT HOLDINGS 1 5 6 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 4 9 11 
SCORPIO TANKERS - 7 10 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 8 8 9 
FRONTLINE LTD 2 3 2 
TEEKAY TANKERS 5 1 8 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - 3 
TORM 3 6 4 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 7 2 7 
Table 25. Company rankings according to 2nd DEA model from 2008 to 2010 
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Chart 12. 2nd DEA model from 2008 to 2011-Small companies 
 
2nd period: 2011-2013 
As happened in the first DEA model the results for the second three-year period are 
ambiguous. For both years, 2011 and 2012, we obtained many single digit results compared 
to the first period 2008-2011. Besides, the industry average for both 2011 and 2012 was 
significantly lower than that of the previous period we examined. To be more precise, while 
the lowest outcome for 2008, 2009 and 2010 was 60.45%, for 2011 and 2012 we receive 
results close to 34% and 33% respectively before the companies bounce back and achieve 
results of 45% in 2013. 
As it is clearly illustrated in table 22 almost all the companies that had single digit results 
in 2011 maintained these results in 2012. The only excepmption was First Ship Lease that 
managed to achieve a significant growth and rise its efficiency score from 6.43% to 
56.05%. The biggest decline was noted by Teekay Tankers as its efficiency fell from 100% 
to 0.35%, while Torm Shipping achieved the largest turnaround as from 25.43% managed 
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to reach 100% in 2012. Navios Maritime and Concordia Maritime where the only 
companies that delivered perfect results (100%) for both years.  
 
For 2013, we saw mixed results. Although the number of companies with scores close to 
0% declined and the number of companies with perfect score increased, the majority of the 
companies delivered inefficient scores as none of the not-perfect scores was over 50%. 
Again Navios Maritime and Concordia Maritime maintained perfect scores as they had 
since 2011, while Nordic American Tankers was the last company to enter the perfect team 
after Torm did in 2012. First Ship Lease was the only company to see decline in its 
efficiency score as it fell from 56.05% to 0.66%. 
 
 
 
 
COMPANY 
difference            
2012-
2011 
difference      
2013-2011 
NAVIOS MARITIME 0.00% 0.00% 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS -85.98% -5.04% 
DHT HOLDINGS 37.50% 579.17% 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS -3.03% 30203.03% 
SCORPIO TANKERS -24.51% 3657.84% 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 633.33% 1586.67% 
FRONTLINE LTD 4.00% 16.00% 
TEEKAY TANKERS -99.65% -82.69% 
CONCORDIA MARITIME 0.00% 0.00% 
TORM 293.24% 293.24% 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 771.70% -89.74% 
Table 26. 2nd DEA model fluctuations from 2011 to 2013 
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COMPANY 2011 2012 2013 
NAVIOS MARITIME 1 1 1 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 4 5 5 
DHT HOLDINGS 8 7 8 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 9 10 2 
SCORPIO TANKERS 7 8 6 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 11 6 9 
FRONTLINE LTD 10 11 11 
TEEKAY TANKERS 2 9 7 
CONCORDIA MARITIME 3 2 3 
TORM 5 3 4 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 6 4 10 
Table 27. Company rankings according to 2nd DEA model from 2011 to 2013 
 
 
 
Chart 13. 2nd DEA model from 2011 to 2014-Large companies 
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Chart 14. 2nd DEA model from 2011 to 2014-Small companies 
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6.2 Results of dry bulk market 
6.2.1 Results of EVA 
 
In this section we present the outcomes obtained by the “Economic Value Added” method 
for dry bulk market. For each company we used the official documents published by the 
companies, which is the 20-F form. According to SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission), each foreign private issuer with listed equity shares on exchanges in USA is 
required to submit this form at the end of each year so that investors can evaluate these 
investments.  The information requirements for 20-F form are not as strict as the 
requirements for domestic U.S. companies that make regular filings, but the essential 
information for the calculation of EVA are included in this form either it issued by a 
domestic U.S public company or a foreign public company.   In previous chapter we 
explained in detail what information is needed for the implementation of EVA method. 
The goal of the mandatory use of 20-F forms is to standardize the form of the info provided, 
so that any potential bias among the calculations is eliminated. Of course, the full 
elimination is not possible, so further adjustments and changes during our research were 
necessary.  
During our research we calculated the EVA for each dry bulk company from 2007 to 2015. 
As we explained we have expanded the range of our research in a longer period in order to 
observe, if possible, other fluctuations in the performance of shipping companies. So before 
we focus on periods where the market experienced a heavy downturn we have included 
two tables that show the calculated EVA for each company for each year and the difference 
from year to year.  
For one more time we decided to calculate the aggregated EVA for the whole industry from 
2007 to 2015 in order to observe the overall performance from year to year and see if 
indeed the years when freight rates experienced the largest declines, companies delivered 
their poorest performances.  
The empty cells indicate that no data was found for the company either because the 
company provided no data for the year or because the company was still private at the time 
and consequently had no obligation to publish its financial statements. Contrary to what 
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we did during the research for the tanker market, here we start our research from 2007 and 
not from 2006. We decided to do so as the data for year 2006 were poor and sometimes 
distorted due to the fact the many bulk carriers were about just execute their IPO or their 
had just executed their IPO and they had not established themselves commercially yet. 
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COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS 227,042 167,779 150,564 86,209 56,180 55,699 27,949 -50,905 -108,533 
DIANA 63,504 212,304 64,848 61,394 75,592 26,375 -87,568 -94,895 -105,069 
CMB 229,991 232,240 98,797 86,034 -17,637 -106,581 -141,934 -161,613 - 
EAGLE BULK 23,297 -24,542 -77,224 -122,217 -52,969 -115,997 -47,596 -92,629 -194,175 
MALAYSIAN BULK 
CARRIERS BHD 
505,703 234,068 205,361 204,625 -34,605 -33,842 -32,949 -19,421 -98,204 
GENCO SHIPPING 70,127 218,418 36,996 18,911 - - - - - 
STARBULK - 58,700 -116,897 -63,328 -120,571 -318,131 -25,237 -161,301 -580,150 
NAVIOS MARITIME 
HOLDINGS 
14,194 228,046 -19,039 21,998 -117,213 15,087 -271,925 -236,893 -300,345 
DRYSHIPS 256,517 -640,533 -430,044 -313,015 -744,638 -1,020,818 -1,498,693 -1,275,024 -2,815,604 
SEANERGY - -59,465 10,588 -12,049 -212,659 -194,706 10,907 80,345 -16,710 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - 40,633 30,284 -18,873 -118,097 -84,056 
TOTAL 1,390,376 627,016 -76,051 -31,438 -1,127,888 -1,662,630 -2,085,918 -2,130,432 -4,302,846 
DIFFERENCE FROM  
 ONE YEAR BEFORE 
- -54.90% -112.13% 58.66% -3487.69% -47.41% -25.46% -2.13% -101.97% 
 
Table 1. Economic Value Added for each company separately and aggregated for all the companies together from 2007 to 2015 
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COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS - -26% -10% -43% -35% -1% -50% -282% -113% 
DIANA - 234% -69% -5% 23% -65% -432% -8% -11% 
CMB - 1% -57% -13% -120% -504% -33% -14% - 
EAGLE BULK - -205% -215% -58% 57% -119% 59% -95% -110% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD - -54% -12% 0% -117% 2% 3% 41% -406% 
GENCO SHIPPING - 211% -83% -49% -100% - - - - 
STARBULK - - -299% 46% -90% -164% 92% -539% -260% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS - 1507% -108% 216% -633% 113% -1902% 13% -27% 
DRYSHIPS - -350% 33% 27% -138% -37% -47% 15% -121% 
SEANERGY - - 118% -214% -1665% 8% 106% 637% -121% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - - -25% -162% -526% 29% 
  
Table 2. Difference of Economic Value Added from year to year from 2007 to 2015 
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1st period: 2008-2010 
As has been explained in previous chapter, the first big fall in freight rates of bulk carriers 
took place during the last months of 2008 as a consequence of the global crisis. However, 
the average value of BDI (Baltic Dry Index) for year 2008 was not much lower than that 
of 2009, as it decreased by 16% from 7252 to 6069 points. The impact of the crisis did not 
became obvious before 2009 when the BDI fell to 2641 points experiencing a fall of 56%.  
Although we discussed only the BDI, it is important to point out that similar fluctuations 
were observed the in each one of the indexes that detect the freight rates for each type of 
bulk carrier separately (Baltic Capesize Index, Baltic Panamax Index, Baltic Supramax 
Index).  
The table 4 shows the fluctuations of the calculated EVA for the companies we evaluated 
for a 3 year-period. We have calculated the percent difference of EVA for the first year of 
low freight rates and one year after. In this way we try to show the impact of low spot 
prices to future revenues. To be more precise, the low spot prices influence the price of 
time-charter contracts in a negative for the shipping company way, because the term-
charter contracts fall. As a result, the companies report low revenues and the calculated 
EVA fall. This phenomenon is obvious not only in table 4, but also in the first table of our 
presentation (table 1), where lower value of aggregated EVA is noted not only in the year 
of the sharp decrease, but also one year, or in some occasions two years afterwards.  
The companies in green shade are the three largest companies in our sample for the period 
2008-2010. We classify the companies by “size” by calculating the fixed assets of each 
company. We decided to use the fixed assets and not the total assets of each company 
because the value of fixed assets is a better indicator of the fleet employed by the company 
to produce the revenues reported. That happens because the total assets includes the value 
of the current assets that might distort the real value of the company if the managers of the 
company has accumulated too much cash compared to other companies. Since this project 
focuses on evaluating companies according to their operational activities and considers all 
the operational values such as operational profit, operational revenues, fixed assets, it 
would be wrong to compare other measures than the strictly operational. In addition, 
maritime companies do invest usually in derivative products to manage their financial risk 
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and, as a result, the value of these products is usually calculated in current assets. Fixed 
assets, on the other hand, represent in most cases the closest value to the value of the vessels 
and for our purpose, which is the operational evaluation of the companies, this value is 
more useful. The value of fixed assets as obtained by the 20-F forms is given in table 3. 
 
COMPANY 
difference         
2009-2008 
difference     
2010-2008 
SAFEBULKERS -10.26% -48.62% 
DIANA -69.45% -71.08% 
CMB -57.46% -62.95% 
EAGLE BULK -214.67% -397.99% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD -12.26% -12.58% 
GENCO SHIPPING -83.06% -91.34% 
STARBULK -299.14% -207.88% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS -108.35% -90.35% 
DRYSHIPS 32.86% 51.13% 
SEANERGY 117.80% 79.74% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - 
 Table 3. Economic Value Added fluctuations from 2008 to 2010 
 
COMPANY 2008 2009 2010 
SAFEBULKERS 6 2 2 
DIANA 5 4 4 
CMB 2 3 3 
EAGLE BULK 8 8 9 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 1 1 1 
GENCO SHIPPING 4 5 6 
STARBULK 7 9 8 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 3 7 5 
DRYSHIPS 10 10 10 
SEANERGY 9 6 7 
PACIFIC BASIN - -  
 Table 4. Company rankings according to EVA from 2008 to 2010 
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As can be illustrated in table 3 and charts 1, 2, even big companies reported significantly 
lower results during periods of low freight rates, despite the size of their fleet. The so-called 
“economy of scale” did not prevent large companies to report very low – near to zero- 
calculated EVAs for 2009. Extreme falls, however were reported by two small companies 
for both years of 2009 and 2010. These companies were Eagle Bulk Shipping and Starbulk. 
Starbulk and Seanergy present ambiguous results due to the fact that back then they were 
relatively new companies with a small fleet. While in some occasions this might be a 
disadvantage, it can turn to huge advantage if the management has been wise enough to tie 
their ships with long-term contracts in a favorable freight rates. That’s seems to be the 
occasion with Seanergy. On the other hand, Starbulk, which was in a phase of expansion 
at the time, seems to experience a big hit at the time from the crisis. All in all, the industry 
experienced an unprecedented fall for year 2009 as every company reported significantly 
lower results, a conclusion that be also drawn from table 1 as the industry’s accumulated 
EVA reduced by more than 100% and fell for the first time in negative region. As far as 
year 2010 is concerned, the majority of the companies hovered around the level they 
reached during the 2009 crisis or managed to improve slightly their numbers.  
 
Chart 1. EVA from 2008 to 2010-Large companies 
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Chart 2. EVA from 2008 to 2010-Small companies 
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2nd period: 2010-2012 
As has been explained in previous chapter the BDI hovered around 2600 points in 2009 
and 2010. The next big fluctuation was also a fall and took place during 2011 when the 
average price for BDI was 1531 points. What is special, however, about this period, is that 
BDI experienced an equally big fall the following year, in 2012. In more detail, after noting 
a 43% decrease in its average price, BDI experienced a fall of 42% during 2012 and it 
landed at 885 points, which was at the time the lowest value ever seen. As can be illustrated 
in table 1, this is the case for the rest of the following years as dry bulk market never really 
recovered; actually period 2011-2012 was the first time that the sample of companies 
selected reported accumulated EVA that was lower than negative one billion for two years 
in a row.  
As happened in the examination of period 2008-2010 we separated again the companies in 
two groups according to the value of fixed assets that each company reported in its balance 
sheet for 2010: a group of large companies and a group of small companies. Again the cells 
that are shaded with green color represent the large companies. 
Genco Shipping and Seanergy were not examined for this period because during the 
research some problems came up regarding the information that should be obtained. The 
problem with Genco shipping was that no info was provided for year 2011 and afterwards 
while Seanergy maritime changed its strategy many times in order to improve its financial 
position. The company was already from 2011 in contact with its lenders in order to prepare 
the capital restructuring that took place in 2014. As a result there were many fluctuations 
regarding its owned fleet and the added value, which has distorted the results obtained not 
only from EVA but from the other valuation methods as well.  As far as Pacific Basin is 
concerned, we have included the firm in our calculations but we did not make any 
comparison as prior to 2011 its operations were not exclusively in dry bulk sector . 
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COMPANY   difference         
  2011-2010 
  difference    
   2012-2010 
SAFEBULKERS -34.83% -35.39% 
DIANA 23.13% -57.04% 
CMB -120.50% -223.88% 
EAGLE BULK 56.66% 5.09% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD -116.91% -116.54% 
GENCO SHIPPING - - 
STARBULK -90.39% -402.36% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS -632.82% -31.42% 
DRYSHIPS -137.89% -226.12% 
SEANERGY -1664.94% -1515.94% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - 
 Table 5. Economic Value Added fluctuations from 2010 to 2012 
 
COMPANY 2010 2011 2012 
SAFEBULKERS 2 2 1 
DIANA 4 1 3 
CMB 3 4 6 
EAGLE BULK 9 6 7 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 1 5 5 
GENCO SHIPPING 6 - - 
STARBULK 8 8 9 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 5 7 4 
DRYSHIPS 10 10 10 
SEANERGY 7 9 8 
PACIFIC BASIN  3 2 
 Table 6. Company rankings according to EVA from 2010 to 2012 
As it is indicated from table 1 only three companies managed to report positive EVA for 
2011, Diana, Safebulkers and Pacific Basin. Compared to the previous recession this 
number is extremely low given the fact that the sample of companies we have consists of 
10-11 companies. For 2010 more than 5 companies reported positive results similar to what 
was the case for 2009. For 2012, the second consecutive year of significant decrease in the 
freight rates, the number of companies reported positive EVA might have increased in 4, 
but the majority of these companies had lower positive than in 2011, which indicates that 
companies still struggle to deliver positive results. The last claim is also reinforced by the 
fact that the accumulated EVA for 2012 also decreased significantly as it fell from -1.2 
billion to -1.6 billion. For once again there were no clear results regarding the two groups 
of small and big companies and their rankings.  
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Chart 3. EVA from 2010 to 2012-Large companies 
 
 
 
Chart 4. EVA from 2010to 2012-Small companies 
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6.2.2 Results of Altman Z - Score 
 
As explained during the results for the tanker market Altman Z-score could not depict the 
fluctuations in companies’ performance during periods when the freight rates take a hard 
fall.   The reasons for this phenomenon have been extensively described during the 
presentation and in this market the consequences are even more obvious. First of all, during 
the research we spotted extreme calculations not only among different companies for the 
same year, while according to EVA  the same companies delivered similar results, but there 
were occasions when for the same company the outcome was substantially higher  for a 
year of recession than a year before.  Returning to form 20-F for the company of the 
example, made it clear that this claim had no grounds as the earnings were lower while the 
fleet and the assets of the company had even increased.  Secondly, the results are easily 
distorted by the ratio of Market Cap/Liabilities which is another reason we see so big 
differences among all companies in table 1.Take for example Seanergy Maritime, which 
had to undergo a restructuring in order to improve its financial position and the Market Cap 
had significant fluctuations during a period reaching extremely high levels despite the fact 
that Seanergy was relatively one the smallest listed companies. 
All in all, as happened in the research of wet market Z-score cannot serve its purpose on 
predicting bankruptcy or financial distress for the near future. The strategy and the 
decision-making in the industry are of such nature that the Z-score cannot detect and 
therefore depict the real financial situation of the shipping companies examined. The 
patience that investors and creditors have showed during harsh times has in a way made 
the Altman Z-score useless, as they prefer to keep their positions and wait for the market 
to bounce back, despite the fact that they could act differently and take extreme measures. 
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COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS 3.70 1.93 1.90 1.54 2.49 2.26 2.72 2.26 0.87 
DIANA 11.94 3.96 2.91 2.28 1.90 1.55 1.82 1.13 0.74 
CMB 4.44 2.42 1.66 1.28 0.55 0.21 0.09 -0.09 - 
EAGLE BULK 1.70 0.75 1.08 0.93 0.26 0.06 -0.57 1.26 0.22 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 9.19 5.68 0.81 0.85 0.91 0.55 24.00 0.03 0.78 
GENCO SHIPPING 12.95 0.87 0.84 0.72 - - - - - 
STARBULK - 4.05 0.77 2.41 0.12 -2.55 1.10 0.59 0.27 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 1.31 1.10 0.85 0.72 0.71 0.96 0.73 0.51 0.35 
DRYSHIPS 0.92 -0.41 0.61 0.36 0.29 0.03 0.13 0.26 1.84 
SEANERGY - 0.15 15.36 9.89 -0.99 -4.58 0.71 - 0.08 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - 1.78 1.90 1.43 1.25 0.75 
Table 7. Altman Z-score for each company from 2007 to 2015 
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COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS - -47.84% -1.55% -18.95% 61.69% -9.24% 20.35% -16.91% -61.50% 
DIANA - -66.83% -26.52% -21.65% -16.67% -18.42% 17.42% -37.91% -34.51% 
CMB - -45.50% -31.40% -22.89% -57.03% -61.82% -57.14% -200.00% - 
EAGLE BULK - -55.88% 44.00% -13.89% -72.04% -76.92% -1050.00% 321.05% -82.54% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD - -38.19% -85.74% 4.94% 7.06% -39.56% 4263.64% -99.88% 2500.00% 
GENCO SHIPPING - -93.28% -3.45% -14.29% - - - - - 
STARBULK - - -80.99% 212.99% -95.02% -2225.00% 143.14% -46.36% -54.24% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS - -16.03% -22.73% -15.29% -1.39% 35.21% -23.96% -30.14% -31.37% 
DRYSHIPS - -144.57% 248.78% -40.98% -19.44% -89.66% 333.33% 100.00% 607.69% 
SEANERGY - - 10140.00% -35.61% -110.01% -362.63% 115.50% - - 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - - 6.74% -24.74% -12.59% -40.00% 
 Table 8. Difference Altman Z-score from year to year from 2007 to 2015 
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1st period: 2008-2010 
 
COMPANY 
difference   
2009-2008 
difference     
2010-2008 
SAFEBULKERS -1.55% -20.21% 
DIANA -26.52% -42.42% 
CMB -31.40% -47.11% 
EAGLE BULK 44.00% 24.00% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS 
BHD -85.74% -85.04% 
GENCO SHIPPING -3.45% -17.24% 
STARBULK -80.99% -40.49% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS -22.73% -34.55% 
DRYSHIPS 248.78% 187.80% 
SEANERGY 10140.00% 6493.33% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - 
Table 9. Z-score fluctuations from 2008 to 2010 
 
 
COMPANY 2008 2009 2010 
SAFEBULKERS 5 3 4 
DIANA 3 2 3 
CMB 4 4 5 
EAGLE BULK 8 5 6 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS 
BHD 1 8 7 
GENCO SHIPPING 7 7 8 
STARBULK 2 9 2 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 6 6 9 
DRYSHIPS 10 10 10 
SEANERGY 9 1 1 
PACIFIC BASIN - -  
Table 10. Company rankings according to Z-score from 2008 to 2010 
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Chart 5. Z-score from 2008 to 2010-Large companies 
 
 
 
Chart 6. Z-score from 2008 to 2010-Small companies 
 
 (1.00)
 -
 1.00
 2.00
 3.00
 4.00
 5.00
 6.00
2008 2009 2010
2008-large companies
GENCO SHIPPING NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD DRYSHIPS
 -
 2.00
 4.00
 6.00
 8.00
 10.00
 12.00
 14.00
 16.00
 18.00
2008 2009 2010
2008-small companies
DIANA CMB EAGLE BULK STARBULK SAFEBULKERS SEANERGY
    
125 
  
 
2nd period: 2010-2012 
 
COMPANY difference            
2011-2010 
difference   
2012-2010 
SAFEBULKERS 61.69% 46.75% 
DIANA -16.67% -32.02% 
CMB -57.03% -83.59% 
EAGLE BULK -72.04% -93.55% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS 
BHD 7.06% -35.29% 
GENCO SHIPPING - - 
STARBULK -95.02% -205.81% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS -1.39% 33.33% 
DRYSHIPS -19.44% -91.67% 
SEANERGY -110.01% -146.31% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - 
Table 11. Z-score fluctuations from 2010 to 2012 
 
 
 
COMPANY 2010 2011 2012 
SAFEBULKERS 4 1 1 
DIANA 3 2 3 
CMB 5 6 6 
EAGLE BULK 6 8 7 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS 
BHD 7 4 5 
GENCO SHIPPING 8 - - 
STARBULK 2 9 9 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 9 5 4 
DRYSHIPS 10 7 8 
SEANERGY 1 10 10 
PACIFIC BASIN  3 2 
Table 12. Company rankings according to Z-score from 2010 to 2012 
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Chart 7. Z-score from 2010 to 2012-Large companies 
 
 
Chart 8. Z-score from 2011 to 2014-Small companies 
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6.2.3 Results of 1st model of DEA 
 
As explained, during the DEA valuation we used two models. The first model is an input-
oriented model that focuses on how much inputs of a company can be reduced without 
affecting the outputs. Its target is to examine the efficiency of the shipping companies as 
far as the income creation is concerned.  
For both models we followed the same procedure as we did during the research on wet 
market. It is important to point out that DEA provides info that cannot be used to in an 
analysis that includes companies of both markets, dry baulk and tanker market. 
Implementation of DEA creates separate frontiers that are created according the sample 
studied. So, while in the case of dry market we have companies that achieve scores of 
100%, these scores represent relative efficiency among the companies of the sample. If we 
used the same companies in the sample of wet market, the same companies would deliver 
much lower efficiency scores. Unlike DEA, EVA allows the comparison of all companies, 
because it is not a relative measure of efficiency, which depends on the sample studied, but 
an absolute measure. As a result, when investors, current or potential, or analysts are 
indifferent to the market each company operates in, they ought to use EVA and not DEA 
as the valuation method that will determine which company is worth its money. In addition, 
this tactic can be expanded to companies of other industries as well, where DEA cannot be 
implemented, as it essential that the units of the sample that are evaluated during a DEA 
are all of the same industry.     
As happened during the first part of our research, for the results obtained by both DEA 
models we calculated the standard deviation, a measure that we did not include in the 
analysis of the results obtained by the previous methods. This measure is used to quantify 
the amount of variation or dispersion of the results. In the results of the previous methods 
we could not use this measure to reach any conclusion as the size effect of each company 
influenced significantly the final result in both EVA and Z-score calculations for various 
reasons. As it will be explained in the next paragraphs the calculation of standard deviation 
led us to some safe conclusions.  
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COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 60.12% 84.92% 
DIANA 96.13% 100.00% 86.53% 85.23% 68.85% 65.44% 76.39% 52.76% 88.30% 
CMB 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 48.74% 55.28% 61.77% 61.83% - 
EAGLE BULK 76.25% 33.81% 56.52% 63.70% 54.46% 46.94% 62.28% 39.02% 72.45% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 100.00% 100.00% 65.63% 100.00% 100.00% 70.76% 50.85% 70.55% 90.70% 
GENCO SHIPPING 90.70% 75.27% 100.00% 98.97% - - - - - 
STARBULK - 63.83% 54.32% 100.00% 91.44% 57.44% 53.27% 42.23% 86.98% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 100.00% 100.00% 95.46% 100.00% 65.64% 100.00% 53.40% 49.77% 95.52% 
DRYSHIPS 64.07% 65.99% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 59.44% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
SEANERGY - 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 35.36% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
AVERAGE 90.89% 83.89% 86.30% 94.79% 82.91% 75.53% 75.80% 67.63% 83.80% 
STANDARD DEVIATION 12.71% 22.05% 18.61% 11.25% 20.02% 20.82% 20.87% 22.90% 18.90% 
DIFFERENCE FROM ONE YEAR BEFORE - -7.71% 2.87% 9.84% -12.53% -8.91% 0.35% -10.78% 23.92% 
Table 13. Efficiency scores for each company separately and relevant statistics for all the companies from 2007 to 2015 
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COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -39.88% 41.26% 
DIANA - 4.02% -13.47% -1.50% -19.22% -4.95% 16.74% -30.93% 67.37% 
CMB - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -51.26% 13.41% 11.74% 0.10% - 
EAGLE BULK - -55.66% 67.20% 12.70% -14.52% -13.80% 32.67% -37.34% 85.68% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD - 0.00% -34.37% 52.36% 0.00% -29.24% -28.13% 38.74% 28.56% 
GENCO SHIPPING - -17.00% 32.85% -1.03% - - - - - 
STARBULK - - -14.89% 84.08% -8.56% -37.19% -7.26% -20.72% 105.95% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -34.36% 52.35% -46.60% -6.80% 91.94% 
DRYSHIPS - 2.99% 51.54% 0.00% 0.00% -40.56% 68.24% 0.00% 0.00% 
SEANERGY - - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -64.64% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Table 14. Efficiency scores fluctuations from year to year from 2007 to 2015 
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1st period: 2008-2010 
Unlike the results that the 1st model of DEA gave us during the research of companies that 
operate in wet market, the results obtained in this case are a bit ambiguous. More 
companies than expected received a score of 100% or a score near to 100%, which indicates 
that they remained efficient for the years 2009 and 2010. While, according to DEA, 6 
companies appeared to be efficient for 2008, the number of companies reduced slightly to 
5 companies for 2009, before it jumped to 6 companies for 2010.  
In more detail, the model spotted small fluctuations that in some cases were even positive. 
That comes to contradiction to what the previous methods had indicated for year 2009 and 
2010. The average score and the standard deviation did not depict any crucial information 
about the industry as a whole the efficiency score decreased temporarily to 65.84% before 
it bounced back to 80.91% surpassing the score of 2008. An interesting feature of the 
results is that Safebulkers managed to remain efficient for the three years achieving scores 
of 100%, Seanergy almost did the same thing with the exception of year 2010 when it 
returned an efficiency score of 90.60%. Overall, the poorest performance was noted by 
Eagle Bulk and Dryships, as the former hovered around 35% for all three years, while the 
latter returned results under 20% for the two first years, before it scores a perfect 100% for 
year 2010. 
 
COMPANY 
difference   
2009-2008 
difference     
2010-2008 
SAFEBULKERS 0.00% 0.00% 
DIANA -13.47% -14.77% 
CMB 0.00% 0.00% 
EAGLE BULK 67.20% 88.43% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD -34.37% 0.00% 
GENCO SHIPPING 32.85% 31.48% 
STARBULK -14.89% 56.68% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 0.00% 0.00% 
DRYSHIPS 51.54% 51.54% 
SEANERGY 0.00% 0.00% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - 
Table 15. 1st DEA model fluctuations from 2008 to 2010 
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COMPANY 2008 2009 2010 
SAFEBULKERS 1 1 1 
DIANA 2 7 9 
CMB 3 2 2 
EAGLE BULK 10 9 10 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 4 8 3 
GENCO SHIPPING 7 3 8 
STARBULK 8 10 4 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 5 4 5 
DRYSHIPS 8 5 6 
SEANERGY 6 6 7 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - 
Table 16. Company rankings according to 1st DEA model from 2008 to 2010 
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Chart 7. 1st DEA model from 2008 to 2010-Large companies 
 
 
 
Chart 8. 1st DEA model from 2008 to 2010-Small companies 
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2nd period: 2010-2012 
The implementation of the 1st model of DEA for the second 3-year term gave us more or 
less similar results to those of the first 3-year term. For once again, we could not spotted 
significant fluctuations due to low freight rates while the number of the companies that 
achieved score of 100% remained high for both years. 
If it was to point out to one fact, it would be that companies showed notable poorer 
performance not in 2011, the first year of the crisis, but in 2012, when we had the second 
straight year of low freight rates in the market. This fact is clearly illustrated by table 17. 
For once again, however, more companies than expected received a score of 100%, with 
Safebulkers and Seanergy standing out for their efficient performance. Although, a score 
of 100% indicates a superior performance towards the other units of the sample, it does not 
necessarily mean that the companies operate efficiently. The fact that so many companies 
appear to operate efficiently in a so distressed market is peculiar, though.   
 
COMPANY 
difference            
2011-2010 
difference   
2012-2010 
SAFEBULKERS 0.00% 0.00% 
DIANA -19.22% -23.22% 
CMB -51.26% -44.72% 
EAGLE BULK -14.52% -26.31% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 0.00% -29.24% 
GENCO SHIPPING - - 
STARBULK -8.56% -42.56% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS -34.36% 0.00% 
DRYSHIPS 0.00% -40.56% 
SEANERGY 0.00% 0.00% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - 
Table 17. 1st DEA model fluctuations from 2010 to 2012 
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COMPANY 2010 2011 2012 
SAFEBULKERS 1 1 1 
DIANA 9 7 6 
CMB 2 10 9 
EAGLE BULK 10 9 10 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 3 2 5 
GENCO SHIPPING 8 - - 
STARBULK 4 6 8 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 5 8 2 
DRYSHIPS 6 3 7 
SEANERGY 7 4 3 
PACIFIC BASIN - 5 4 
Table 18. Company rankings according to 1st DEA model from 2010 to 2012 
 
 
 
Chart 9. 1st DEA model from 2010 to 2012-Large companies 
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Chart 10. 1st DEA model from 2010 to 2012 - Small companies 
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6.2.4 Results of 2nd model of DEA 
 
The second model of DEA we used was similar to the first model in terms of orientation 
and number of data used. We used again an input-oriented model where we had two input 
units and one output unit. However, this model was more specific than the previous as it 
examined the ability of each company to make profit as a result of the utilization of the 
ships. So, companies that had higher operating costs than revenues, and therefore negative 
net income, obtain low efficient scores, while in the previous model those companies will 
not take so low scores. 
To be more specific, we used as input the value of the vessels and the operating cost of the 
vessels, while the output unit for this model was the gross profit created. All the units used 
in this model are subunits of the units used in the first DEA model. In order to obtain the 
necessary data we used the balance sheet and the income statement published by each 
company for the 9-year period 2007-2015, as we have done for the rest of the project. In 
this model, however, there were some occasions where we should make some adjustments 
or further calculations before we obtained the necessary values.  
Unlike to what happened during the research of companies that operate in the wet market, 
where we had scores close to 0%, here in dry bulk market we do not see such scores because 
even the companies that are efficient and determine the efficient frontier have poor 
performances and the “efficiency distance” between the best ones and the bad ones is 
diminished. This phenomenon is similar to the phenomenon described during the 
presentation of the results of the 1st DEA model, when outcome entailed many perfect 
scores of 100%, while it was known that companies had occurred many damages in their 
financial positions due to the decrease in their cash flows. Overall, we can say the dry 
market appears to be more homogenous than the wet market. While in the wet market, 
there were some companies that managed to distinguish and “push” the efficient frontier 
further out, here in the dry bulk market companies move similarly, so the DEA cannot 
show clearly which companies have managed to stand out.   
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COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 1.99% 20.07% 
DIANA 42.37% 100.00% 44.25% 58.46% 67.51% 55.77% 14.36% 1.16% 13.74% 
CMB 65.93% 74.86% 86.44% 75.33% 86.84% 27.01% 3.03% 0.23% - 
EAGLE BULK 45.79% 35.08% 38.08% 35.85% 32.91% 33.85% 19.03% 1.06% 26.50% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 100.00% 100.00% 59.58% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 59.21% 1.20% 100.00% 
GENCO SHIPPING 45.00% 97.10% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% - - - - 
STARBULK - 61.34% 60.35% 100.00% 31.25% 96.95% 40.93% 1.89% 11.26% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 87.77% 42.42% 51.57% 48.87% 100.00% 100.00% 9.72% 0.77% 10.83% 
DRYSHIPS 100.00% 14.58% 18.17% 100.00% 100.00% 19.05% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
SEANERGY - 100.00% 100.00% 90.60% 42.89% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - -  100.00% 25.67% 0.07% 26.40% 
AVERAGE 73.36% 72.54% 65.84% 80.91% 76.14% 73.26% 47.19% 20.84% 45.42% 
Standard Deviation 24.79% 30.69% 27.76% 23.47% 28.33% 33.28% 37.73% 39.59% 38.97% 
DIFFERENCE FROM ONE YEAR BEFORE - -1.12% -9.23% 22.88% -5.90% -3.78% -35.58% -55.85% 117.98% 
Table 19. Efficiency scores for each company separately and relevant statistics for all the companies from 2007 to 2015 
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COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -98.01% 909.97% 
DIANA - 136.00% -55.75% 32.12% 15.48% -17.39% -74.26% -91.94% 1087.42% 
CMB - 13.55% 15.47% -12.85% 15.28% -68.90% -88.79% -92.51% - 
EAGLE BULK - -23.39% 8.56% -5.86% -8.20% 2.85% -43.77% -94.44% 2402.54% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD - 0.00% -40.42% 67.83% 0.00% 0.00% -40.79% -97.98% 8253.68% 
GENCO SHIPPING - 115.78% 2.98% 0.00% 0.00% - - - - 
STARBULK - - -1.61% 65.71% -68.75% 210.22% -57.78% -95.37% 494.12% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS - -51.67% 21.59% -5.25% 104.64% 0.00% -90.28% -92.04% 1300.00% 
DRYSHIPS - -85.42% 24.56% 450.47% 0.00% -80.95% 424.94% 0.00% 0.00% 
SEANERGY - - 0.00% -9.40% -52.67% 133.18% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - - - -74.33% -99.71% 35322.20% 
 Table 20. Efficiency scores’ fluctuations from year to year from 2007 to 2015 
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1st period: 2008-2010 
As happened with the results of the 1st DEA model, the results of the 2nd DEA model for 
the period 2008-2010 are not clear. Of course, the average efficiency score has decreased 
by 7% reaching a score of 65%, but again the downturn that was expected was not 
eventually depicted in the individual result of each company. Most of the companies 
delivered results that were similar to those of the 2008, while instead of receiving scores 
that were decreased compared to those of 2008, there were many scores that was 
significantly increased.  
COMPANY 
difference   
2009-2008 
difference     
2010-2008 
SAFEBULKERS 0.00% 0.00% 
DIANA -55.75% -41.54% 
CMB 15.47% 0.63% 
EAGLE BULK 8.56% 2.19% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD -40.42% 0.00% 
GENCO SHIPPING 2.98% 2.98% 
STARBULK -1.61% 63.04% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 21.59% 15.20% 
DRYSHIPS 24.56% 585.66% 
SEANERGY 0.00% -9.40% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - 
 Table 21. 2nd DEA model fluctuations from 2008 to 2010 
 
COMPANY 2008 2009 2010 
SAFEBULKERS 2 2 4 
DIANA 1 8 8 
CMB 6 4 7 
EAGLE BULK 9 9 10 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 4 6 2 
GENCO SHIPPING 5 3 3 
STARBULK 7 5 1 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 8 7 9 
DRYSHIPS 10 10 5 
SEANERGY 3 1 6 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - 
 Table 22. Company rankings according to 2nd DEA model from 2008 to 2010 
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Chart 11. 2nd DEA model from 2008 to 2010-Large companies 
 
 
 
Chart 12. 2nd DEA model from 2008 to 2010-Small companies 
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2nd period: 2010-2012 
For the second 3-year term the 2nd model of DEA returned results similar to those of the 
first term. Again we observe a slight fall in the average efficiency score but most of the 
companies remain stable. The only companies that saw a significant fall was CMB and 
Dryships whose scores fell to under 30% for the 2nd year of the crisis in the dry bulk market. 
COMPANY 
difference            
2011-2010 
difference   
2012-2010 
SAFEBULKERS 0.00% 0.00% 
DIANA 15.48% -4.59% 
CMB 15.28% -64.15% 
EAGLE BULK -8.20% -5.58% 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 0.00% 0.00% 
GENCO SHIPPING - - 
STARBULK -68.75% -3.05% 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 104.64% 104.64% 
DRYSHIPS 0.00% -80.95% 
SEANERGY -52.67% 10.37% 
PACIFIC BASIN - - 
 Table 23. 2nd DEA model fluctuations from 2010 to 2012 
 
COMPANY 2010 2011 2012 
SAFEBULKERS 4 3 2 
DIANA 8 7 7 
CMB 7 6 9 
EAGLE BULK 10 9 8 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 2 5 4 
GENCO SHIPPING 3 1 - 
STARBULK 1 10 6 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 9 4 5 
DRYSHIPS 5 2 10 
SEANERGY 6 8 1 
PACIFIC BASIN - - 3 
Table 24. Company rankings according to 2nd DEA model from 2010 to 2012 
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Chart 13. 2nd DEA model from 2010 to 2012-Large companies 
 
 
Chart 14. 2nd DEA model from 2010 to 2012-Small companies 
 
 
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
2010 2011 2012
2010-large companies
DRYSHIPS NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD EAGLE BULK
CMB DIANA
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
2010 2011 2012
2010-small companies
STARBULK SAFEBULKERS SEANERGY
    
143 
  
6.3 Interpretation of results 
 
The majority of the valuation methods that were implemented in the diploma thesis are 
used for decision-making purposes by potential investors and creditors. As it has been 
explained in previous chapter, each method has a different structure that focuses on 
different features of a shipping company and of its operation, leading to different results. 
The reason there have been created so many different valuation techniques is that each 
method functions differently depending on the circumstances, such the overall 
performance of equity markets, the trust that investors show in each industry depending 
rational or irrational expectations, the international agreements that favor or harm the trade 
etc.  
Since we have studied past data during our research, the most appropriate benchmark that 
indicates how successful or unsuccessful each method has been can be the markets. The 
stock exchanges around the world act as “meeting points” where investors express their 
expectations about the public-traded companies by determining a price that they are willing 
to pay for a partial ownership in a company. A rise in the price of a stock company depicts 
the positive view the market has on the company, whereas a negative view depicts the 
opposite. Of course, this claim does not stand when the company executes practices such 
as an internal restructuring, stock split, secondary offering etc. The measure that is 
indicative of a company’s value and fluctuates according to the price of its shares is the 
market capitalization.  The market capitalization is calculated by multiplying the number 
of stocks issued by the price of a stock. It is indicative of what market thinks of the future 
prospects of a company as well as of the ranking of the company.  
In our research we did not use the absolute value of market capitalization of each company 
but its fluctuations. For each company that we studied, we created time-series of the market 
capitalization and the results of each valuation method we used. Then we calculated the 
correlation coefficients for each one time-series created by the valuation methods and the 
time series created by the market capitalization values.  
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The first step of the statistical analysis was the calculation of the correlation coefficients 
for the whole period of valuation and then for each one of the 3-year period that we studied 
during the diploma thesis. Then we compare the fluctuations of each company and the 
average price of each case. In the next analysis cells with green color depicts the largest 
companies by fixed assets for the period studied.  
 
6.3.1 Wet Market 
 
EVA 
COMPANY 
correlation coefficient 
2006-2015 2008-2010 2011-2013 
NAVIOS MARITIME -0.522 - -0.991 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 0.018 -0.953 0.409 
DHT HOLDINGS 0.524 -0.221 0.771 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 0.714 -0.788 -0.952 
SCORPIO TANKERS 0.143 - 0.748 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 0.753 0.838 -0.005 
FRONTLINE LTD 0.384 -0.797 -0.276 
TEEKAY TANKERS 0.299 -0.754 0.568 
CONCORDIA MARITIME -0.189 - -0.489 
TORM 0.165 0.379 -0.473 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 0.465 - 0.186 
    
AVERAGE 0.250 -0.328 -0.046 
Table 25. Correlation coefficients for EVA results-market capitalization 
According to the table 25 the results given by EVA method have a positive correlation with 
the market capitalization for 10-year period.  9 of 11 companies studied returned positive 
correlation coefficients. During the crisis periods, however, the case is much different. For 
both periods, all the companies returned mixed results independently of their size and the 
overall correlation that they had presented. The average values altered significantly as the 
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correlation was slightly negative for 2008-2010 period (-0.32) and almost zero for the 
2011-2013 period (-0.04). 
 
Altman Z-score 
At this point we have to point out that market cap value is included in Z-score’s formula 
with a coefficient of 0.6 which is the lowest among the five coefficients. We will assessed 
the results in the same way but we keep in mind that in some cases there might be 
distortions.  
 
COMPANY 
correlation coefficient 
2006-2015 2008-2010 2011-2013 
NAVIOS MARITIME 0.833 - 0.985 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS 0.791 0.787 0.868 
DHT HOLDINGS 0.976 0.927 0.941 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 0.551 0.698 0.989 
SCORPIO TANKERS 0.589 - 0.989 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 0.933 0.960 0.997 
FRONTLINE LTD 0.989 0.985 0.953 
TEEKAY TANKERS 0.167 -0.975 0.508 
CONCORDIA MARITIME 0.656 - 0.998 
TORM 0.968 0.652 0.801 
FIRST SHIP LEASE 0.288 - 0.486 
    
AVERAGE 0.704 0.576 0.865 
Table 26. Correlation coefficients for Z-score results-market capitalization 
As table 26 indicates the results derived by the implementation of Altman Z-score method 
have high positive correlation with the market capitalization. The only negative value we 
obtained was that of the Teekay Tankers for the first period of low freight rates. The most 
impressive statistic, however, is the correlation for period 2011-2013, when all the 
companies had a coefficient above 0.5, while the average price of the coefficients 
skyrocketed to 0.86. For once again, there are no noticeable differences between the results 
calculated for the “large” and the “small” companies.  
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Of course, after further research on the implementation of Z-score we reached the 
conclusion that the results are distorted not because of the coefficient 0.6 of Z – formula 
but because the value that ratio Market Cap/ Total Liabilities returns is the highest among 
all the values that are to be inserted into the Z-formula. So it is logical that there will be 
very high correlation between the Z-score results and market capitalization of the company. 
 
1st model of DEA 
Calculating the correlation coefficients for results obtained from DEA method is a bit tricky 
because when a company is characterized as efficient for a number of years in a row and 
“creates” the efficient frontier , its score stays stable at 100% without deviating at all. As a 
result there cannot be any calculation for correlation coefficients and the number of the 
data is limited. This phenomenon was expected as the DEA models that we created were 
structured in a way that they do not take into consideration those results reported by 
companies in annual or quarterly reports that market experts look at before pricing a 
company. In addition, DEA is a valuation that returns “relative results” as it detects the 
most efficient companies of the sample and distinguish them from the others without any 
other consideration such as profit or loss for a period, which, in any case, is crucial for the 
market. 
COMPANY 
correlation coefficient 
2006-2015 2008-2010 2011-2013 
NAVIOS MARITIME -0.162 - - 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS -0.707 0.669 -0.806 
DHT HOLDINGS 0.875 0.591 0.767 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 0.230 -0.989 0.535 
SCORPIO TANKERS -0.214 - 0.229 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 0.625 0.050 -0.574 
FRONTLINE LTD 0.659 - -0.991 
TEEKAY TANKERS -0.159 -0.845 0.068 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - - 
TORM -0.955 0.951 - 
FIRST SHIP LEASE -0.658 - -0.316 
    
AVERAGE -0.047 0.071 -0.136 
Table 27. Correlation coefficients for 1st DEA model results-market capitalization 
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The correlation coefficients for the results of the 1st DEA model are the most clearly 
generated until this step. According to them, there is no correlation at all between the results 
generated by DEA and the prospects that market has for each company. The calculated 
average values hovered around zero (0), while most of the companies presented mixed 
trends in the correlation analysis. The only company that stood out was DHT Holdings as 
it returned high positive results during for the three periods of analysis.  
 
 
2nd model of DEA 
 
COMPANY 
correlation coefficient 
2006-2015 2008-2010 2011-2013 
NAVIOS MARITIME -0.615 - - 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS -0.486 0.981 0.274 
DHT HOLDINGS 0.891 0.063 0.998 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 0.138 -0.704 0.736 
SCORPIO TANKERS 0.478 - 0.995 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 0.944 0.437 0.834 
FRONTLINE LTD 0.867 -0.723 0.834 
TEEKAY TANKERS -0.306 -0.746 -0.316 
CONCORDIA MARITIME 0.170 - - 
TORM -0.121 -0.743 0.951 
FIRST SHIP LEASE -0.417 - -0.416 
    
AVERAGE 0.140 -0.205 0.543 
Table 28. Correlation coefficients for 2nd DEA model results-market capitalization 
 
The 2nd model of DEA behaves better than the 1st one mainly because of the output that 
was the profit each company reported.  As has been explained before, the profit or the loss 
is the most important feature a company has to give when it is public-traded, because 
investors’ main concern is the maximization of the value in a sustainable way. The 
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interesting fact with this method is, however, that it depicts very different reactions from 
the investors depending on the period of crisis. More specifically, we see that during the 
first 3-year period there is no correlation at all, while during the second 3-year period there 
was highly positive correlation for the majority of the companies. As a result, the average 
price reached the 0.5, the highest value of the 6 average values we met during the analysis 
of DEA models.  
 
6.3.2 Dry Bulk Market 
 
In this section we do not assess only the results obtained for the dry bulk market, but we 
also try to spot differences that may exist between the dry bulk market and the wet market. 
For example, some methods may return more efficient results for one market that for the 
other. The reason for that issue is that the market has different views on the two sectors 
studied and different expectations regarding the capability of some companies to return 
efficient results.  
EVA 
COMPANY 
correlation coefficient 
2007-2015 2008-2010 2010-2012 
SAFEBULKERS 0.237 -0.8983 0.722 
DIANA 0.319 -0.494 0.351 
CMB 0.530 -0.963 0.954 
EAGLE BULK 0.333 -0.808 -0.542 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD -0.444 0.999 0.574 
GENCO SHIPPING -0.122 -0.975 - 
STARBULK 0.519 0.924 0.762 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS -0.339 -0.928 0.438 
DRYSHIPS 0.550 0.773 0.922 
SEANERGY 0.138 0.201 0.998 
PACIFIC BASIN 0.462 - - 
    
AVERAGE 0.199 -0.217 0.575 
Table 29. Correlation coefficients for EVA results-market capitalization 
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The table 29 indicates that the market has different views on dry bulk companies than on 
tanker companies. We see that the EVA results agree with the market trend for the 9-year 
period with a low coefficient (0.199) and with a high coefficient (0.576) for the second 3-
year period that we studied. On the other hand, during the same process for tanker 
companies we obtained correlation factors closer to zero (0). 
 During the crisis of 2008 the average was low negative (-0.2). However, the most 
interesting fact is that almost all the companies returned correlation coefficient with high 
absolute values, resulting to a sample of high standard deviation. In particular, 5 companies 
returned a correlation factor lower than -0.8, while, on the other hand, of the 4 companies 
that had a positive correlation, the 3 of them had a correlation coefficient higher than 0.75.   
 
Altman Z-score 
COMPANY 
correlation coefficient 
2007-2015 2008-2010 2010-2012 
SAFEBULKERS 0.366 -0.832 -0.530 
DIANA 0.970 -0.157 0.928 
CMB 0.822 -1.000 0.990 
EAGLE BULK 0.744 -0.008 0.982 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD -0.163 1.000 0.970 
GENCO SHIPPING 1.000 -0.544 - 
STARBULK 0.760 0.818 0.905 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS -0.266 -0.993 -0.567 
DRYSHIPS -0.091 0.282 0.664 
SEANERGY 0.408 0.161 0.965 
PACIFIC BASIN 0.711 - - 
    
AVERAGE 0.478 -0.127 0.590 
Table 30. Correlation coefficients for Z-score results-market capitalization 
 
As it was pointed out during the interpretation of the results for the wet market, this method 
is expected to high correlation as the market capitalization is included in the Z-formula and 
its weight appears to be high as well. For companies that operate in the dry bulk market we 
see that there is high positive correlation for the majority of the companies for the 9-year 
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period and the second 3-year period, but there is again low correlation of about -0.1 during 
the financial crisis of 2008. All in all, this method returned similar results to those of EVA 
method for the dry market. 
 
1st model of DEA 
COMPANY 
correlation coefficient 
2007-2015 2008-2010 2010-2012 
SAFEBULKERS 0.325 - - 
DIANA 0.524 -0.442 0.999 
CMB 0.472 - 0.957 
EAGLE BULK 0.326 0.641 0.908 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 0.292 0.500 0.996 
GENCO SHIPPING -0.027 0.995 - 
STARBULK -0.282 -0.403 0.746 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS -0.499 - 0.398 
DRYSHIPS 0.200 0.500 0.500 
SEANERGY 0.173 - - 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - 
    
AVERAGE 0.150 0.258 0.786 
Table 31. Correlation coefficients for 1st DEA model results-market capitalization 
 
Unlike the results obtained for the wet market, the results obtained from 1st model of DEA 
for the dry bulk market show a clear positive correlation between the scores of DEA and 
the market capitalization. The average value of the results was low for the whole period, 
but during the shortest periods it increased considerably reaching a 0.25 during the 
financial crisis of 2008 and a 0.7 during the period 2010-2012.  
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2nd model of DEA 
COMPANY 
correlation coefficient 
2007-2015 2008-2010 2010-2012 
SAFEBULKERS 0.369 -0.647 -0.205 
DIANA 0.115 -0.707 -0.183 
CMB 0.152 0.209 0.496 
EAGLE BULK 0.307 -0.329 0.940 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 0.304 0.500 -0.229 
GENCO SHIPPING -0.999 0.990 - 
STARBULK -0.036 -0.557 0.422 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS -0.278 0.870 -0.993 
DRYSHIPS 0.200 0.999 0.500 
SEANERGY -0.020 -1.000 0.385 
PACIFIC BASIN 0.265 - - 
    
AVERAGE 0.034 0.033 0.126 
Table 32. Correlation coefficients for 2nd DEA model results-market capitalization 
 
For one more time we see completely different behavior by the same method when applied 
to different markets. Unlike the results calculated for wet market, the results for dry market 
show high volatility for the majority of the companies. Only one company managed to 
maintain a stable sign for the 3 periods of research, while the other companies not only 
changed sign at least once, but they have big fluctuations on the absolute values of the 
coefficients that they returned. The result of that is also that the calculated average values 
are close to zero (0), indicating no correlation at all for this particular sample of companies.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION  
 
7.1 Conclusion  
 
From the conducted research, it is confirmed that each method is suitable for use under 
specific circumstances.  There is no valuation method that is dominant over other and the 
most important of all is that in a volatile market like that of shipping industry there is little 
room for reliable long-term predictions. All in all, when investors apply valuation methods, 
except the conditions in the shipping market, they should also consider the sector of 
shipping they are applying them to, as well as the overall sentiment of the worldwide 
market.  
More specifically, the results indicated that the methods do not perform well during periods 
of global financial crisis, like that 2008, as during those periods the majority of the 
investors try to liquidate their assets which leads in rapid depreciation of the stocks’ prices. 
This practice, however, makes the valuation process useless as the prices are not driven by 
investors’ future expectations and views on the companies’ performances but on their 
choice to sell fast in order to avoid another fall in the shares’ prices. Depending the market 
the companies under research operate, the methods behave in a very different way. EVA 
method and the 1st model of DEA appear to perform much better when applied at dry bulk 
companies, while the second model of DEA appears to be more efficient when it is used 
for valuation of companies that operate mainly tankers. As far as Altman Z – Score is 
concerned, we pointed out that this is the only method, among the 4 we used, that uses the 
market capitalization as input in the valuation formula and consequently we receive high 
correlation coefficients. Even in this case, however, it should be noted that the results 
obtained for the most volatile market, dry bulk market, are lower than those of wet market. 
This does not change the fact that Altman’s method need more modifications in its structure 
in order to be applied in a distressed industry, such as shipping industry. Generally, in a 
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highly leveraged industry, such as maritime, it is preferable to use valuation methods that 
are based on the performance of the companies.  
 
7.2 Future research suggestions 
 
It is obvious that in shipping market, which is very competitive and shows many ups and 
downs, it is difficult to find a traditional valuation method that can be used as a reliable 
tool for investors. In order to obtain better results it would be useful to focus on additional 
data that would allow investors to examine the strategy of a company thoroughly. A 
valuation method, for example, that would take into consideration not only the overall 
performance of a company but the areas where its fleet operates would be more reliable as 
the freight rates differ from region to region and from route to route. In addition, it would 
be interesting to analyze the companies’ performance according to the size of the ships 
they operate and observe if there is a trend in their performance depending on what type of 
ships they operate during a specific period. The combination of these features could lead 
to a sustainable method and more reliable results than those calculated according to 
conventional methods that are structured to follow only the balance sheet data.  
In our research we studied how valuation methods behave during recession periods, it 
would be also useful to do a similar research about how valuation methods work when the 
shipping market is in a rise. In this way, there might appear more modifications that would 
be useful to be considered during the creation of a valuation method for the shipping 
industry.  
Last but not least, in a highly volatile market with many companies that have high ratios 
of debt to equity, many companies go bankrupt or deal with distressed situations such as 
difficulties to find extra funding or weakness to pay their debts on time. So a model, similar 
to that of Altman, would be useful for predicting distressed situations or even bankruptcy 
in a specific time horizon. Of course, a model like that requires an extensive research 
beforehand in order to determine the ratios that would be included in the formula as well 
as their respective coefficients.  
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APPENDIX 
 
DATA USED IN DEA: 
Tables A1, A2, A3 - Dry sector – 1st model of DEA 
Tables A4, A5, A6 - Dry sector – 2nd model of DEA 
Tables A7, A8, A9 - Wet sector – 1st model of DEA 
Tables A10, A11, A12 - Wet sector – 2nd model of DEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
159 
  
TABLE A.1 - ASSETS (INPUT) 
COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS 407657 482282 628724 805372 877721 1082214 1122216 1182329 1309631 
DIANA 944342 1057206 1320425 1585389 1604471 1742802 1701981 1787122 1836965 
CMB 989246 1175453 1250660 1672045 1771173 1876892 1762535 1607398 - 
EAGLE BULK 1136008 1362175 1608202 1896572 1867256 1789144 1723414 913876 787038 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 2187708 2483705 2296186 1997254 1162996 1107855 1172361 1545583 1544469 
GENCO SHIPPING 1653272 1990006 2336802 3182708 - - - - - 
STARBULK - 891376 760461 891376 717928 354706 468088 2062084 2164883 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 1971004 2253624 2935182 3676767 2913824 2941462 2919613 3159389 2958813 
DRYSHIPS 2344432 4842680 5806995 6984494 8621689 8878491 10123692 10371603 476052 
SEANERGY - 378202 538452 696401 436476 120960 66350 3268 209352 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - 2431752 2470000.3 2537446 2307516 2145735 
 
TABLE A.2 - OPERATING COST (INPUT) 
COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS 46000 35000 60000 35098 59972 72345 93875 127378 159333 
DIANA 52542 111554 115006 141809 144753 159669 172658 157372 204889 
CMB 92269 223784 276095 375377 550887 612665 435314 547709 - 
EAGLE BULK 60331 108669 127204 189376 281764 228029 171296 205000 239394 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 228681 382389 203682 209463 172260 165054 177625 205804 261088 
GENCO SHIPPING 54317 170993 169039 227396 - - - - - 
STARBULK - 96108 191658 120782 171834 393091 61460 148819 659860 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 1971004 2253624 2935182 3676767 2913824 2941462 2919613 3159389 2958813 
DRYSHIPS 2344432 4842680 5806995 6984494 8621689 8878491 10123692 10371603 476052 
SEANERGY - 378202 538452 696401 436476 120960 66350 3268 209352 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - 2431752 2470000.3 2537446 2307516 2145735 
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TABLE A.3 – REVENUES (OUTPUT) 
COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS 172057 200772 164606 157020 172036 187557 186721 159900 127317 
DIANA 190480 337391 239342 275448 255669 220785 240633 175576 157712 
CMB 361068 482210 413514 485293 365967 368990 409104 485019 - 
EAGLE BULK 124815 185425 196574 265036 313432 190811 202439 154000 103856 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 608142 721158 303707 404250 363938 157395 161978 255724 241504 
GENCO SHIPPING 185387 405370 379531 447438 - - - - - 
STARBULK - 238883 142351 238883 106912 85684 68296 145041 234286 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 758420 1246062 598676 679918 689355 614494 569016 512279 480820 
DRYSHIPS 582561 1080702 819834 859745 1077662 1210139 1492014 2185524 969825 
SEANERGY - 35333 87897 95856 104060 55616 23079 55616 11223 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - 1342535 1443086 1708792 1718500 1260291 
 
TABLE A.4 - VESSEL EXPENSES (INPUT) 
COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS 12429 17615 19628 23128 26066 34450 41964 50634 55469 
DIANA 29332 39899 41369 52585 55375 66293 77211 86923 88272 
CMB 208342 291157 246135 302711 426459 470716 366284 443790 - 
EAGLE BULK 27143 36270 50161 72983 85049 90551 84424 95000 92439 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 150000 250000 140000 105813 107629 104871 84766 84038 80559 
GENCO SHIPPING 27620 47130 57311 78796 - - - - - 
STARBULK - 26198 30168 22349 25247 27832 27087 53096 112796 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 27892 26621 31454 47109 117269 117790 114074 130064 128168 
DRYSHIPS 63225 79662 165891 201887 373122 649722 649722 609765 371074 
SEANERGY - 3180 16222 30667 34227 26983 11086 1006 5639 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - 1000000 1100000 1300000 1350000 900000 
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TABLE A.5 - VESSELS VALUE (FIXED ASSETS) (INPUT) 
COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS 254817 286955 373924 541244 655356 810001 855200 960423 988161 
DIANA 867632 1060311 1123105 1160850 1046719 1211138 1320375 1373133 1440803 
CMB 451125 484743 432589 718488 1259922 1631669 1448514 1305479 - 
EAGLE BULK 605244 874674 1010669 1509798 1789381 1714307 1639555 834052 733960 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 655175 581858 627554 562391 549743 486227 515018 750622 648422 
GENCO SHIPPING 1224040 1726273 2023506 2783810 - - - - - 
STARBULK - 821284 668698 610817 638532 291207 394606 1441851 1757552 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 425591 737094 1557741 2249677 1767946 1746493 1777457 1911143 1823961 
DRYSHIPS 1643867 2134650 2058329 1917966 1956270 2059570 2249087 2141617 96428 
SEANERGY - 345622 444820 597372 381129 68511 0 0 199840 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - 1525185 270202 1622297 1584924 1611000 
 
TABLE A.6 - GROSS PROFIT (OPERATING) (OUTPUT) 
COMPANY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
SAFEBULKERS 230925 163660 177714 121922 108936 111951 92846 26716 -32016 
DIANA 137938 225837 124336 133369 110916 63116 -8653 -18204 -47177 
CMB 268799 258426 137419 109916 129418 43724 4978 -51838 - 
EAGLE BULK 64483 76755 65370 75569 31668 -37218 31143 -51600 -135537 
MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD 586845 531758 165256 212915 67162 66451 45506 18333 -1196 
GENCO SHIPPING 131070 234377 210492 221291 - - - - - 
STARBULK - 142775 -49307 260 -64769 -306929 8434 -1432 -425574 
NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS 273523 46706 40177 105098 6030 127646 -128895 -119731 -190705 
DRYSHIPS 531800 -14035 58314 367390 169660 15854 155576 543179 -881508 
SEANERGY - -31320 40374 18424 -183607 -181117 19271 81810 -7055 
PACIFIC BASIN - - - - 108437 81867 55097 -39624 -4111 
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TABLE A.7 – ASSETS (INPUT) 
COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - - - 1005087 1195469 1364644 1644661 1685014 1767576 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS - 556991 700154 760928 758256 1196289 1070128 1401772 1493095 1555875 
DHT HOLDINGS 349040 422208 531348 517971 480855 504467 399759 446599 1378096 1423805 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 800180 804628 813878 946578 1083083 1383267 1085624 1136437 1175860 1244626 
SCORPIO TANKERS - - - 104422 412268 448229 573280 1646676 2804643 3523455 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 1966817 2359385 2602317 2549720 2702260 2535337 2450884 2483899 2699097 2900697 
FRONTLINE LTD 4048815 3762091 4027728 3715218 3798803 1840569 1688221 1367605 2501768 2887281 
TEEKAY TANKERS 298625 310324 599535 539963 936517 881926 1105656 1097529 1241172 2169476 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - - - 3460.8 3758.2 3480.7 3406.5 3715.8 4354.5 
TORM 2089019 2966562 3317353 3227211 3286108 2779207 2355337 2007610 625914 1867441 
FIRST SHIP LEASE - 629234 932665 903239 836069 822415 774935 662627 594916 560206 
 
TABLE A.8 - OPERATING COST (INPUT) 
COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - - - 10300 64233 81877 80392 111789 115149 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PRT - 39368 58032 70588 73274 95018 150704 130171 132066 146538 
DHT HOLDINGS 37994 40469 52123 61384 66482 133677 186698 86005 123381 229271 
NORDIC AMERICAN TNK 103278 133741 106712 121952 125638 166000 198584 150049 156394 158989 
SCORPIO TANKERS - - - 23398 37637 157708 132556 189788 271800 448627 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAV. 222408 250915 344202 372251 327311 432859 392699 413486 424965 399635 
FRONTLINE LTD 967413 898904 1395831 896237 888238 849476 594212 641182 632908 280639 
TEEKAY TANKERS 95941 97348 72644 71681 104105 113903 537624 166676 187944 326993 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - - - 413.2 452 465 467 474 600 
TORM 602728 461200 646000 620000 676329 1224174 1028433 841979 131462 304536 
FIRST SHIP LEASE - 31325 62504 67771 80530 107310 86827 130621 76617 83235 
AVERAGE 338,293 244,158.7 342,256.00 256,140.22 217,296.11 304,073.64 308,243.55 257,346.91 204,527.27 226,746.55 
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TABLE A.9 – REVENUES (OUTPUT) 
COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - - - 33568 121295 151097 202397 264877 313396 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS - 86545 147617 134519 113562 130316 153950 171494 192777 220344 
DHT HOLDINGS 86793 81427 144603 102576 89681 100123 97194 87012 150789 365114 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 175520 186986 228000 124370 126419 94787 130682 243657 351049 445738 
SCORPIO TANKERS - - - 27619 38797 82109 115381 207580 342807 755711 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 427654 500617 623040 444926 408006 395162 393989 418379 501013 587715 
FRONTLINE LTD 1558369 1299927 2104018 1133286 1165215 810102 578361 517190 559688 458934 
TEEKAY TANKERS 153093 146307 163327 159690 139479 215072 197429 180015 250002 514193 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - - - 513.4 559.6 543.4 467.8 531 810 
TORM 455394 644965 1183594 862251 856095 1305208 1121215 992336 179873 540404 
FIRST SHIP LEASE - 40715 86621 98768 100494 110714 106107 89993 93414 106583 
 
TABLE A.10 - VESSEL EXPENSES (INPUT) 
COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - - - 18000 35000 40000 42000 65000 67000 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS - 22000 30500 33000 31000 45000 60000 55300 62029 70333 
DHT HOLDINGS 35500 38500 21409 30034 30221 30811 41684 50500 92303 127000 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 61274 79000 45593 52000 47113 69700 101200 234310 62500 66589 
SCORPIO TANKERS - - - 8562 20000 38200 52097 45000 86355 178994 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 145160 180431 226000 221000 301000 143000 244251 247740 300000 273985 
FRONTLINE LTD 599046 548000 705000 425000 482000 487000 404589 95300 153315 173063 
TEEKAY TANKERS 68111 69210 36111 36327 47000 44753 100000 100000 109626 156980 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - - - 155 162.6 139.7 132.1 123 142 
TORM 77700 127000 174000 1695000 152207 164949 168903 173367 50254 122867 
FIRST SHIP LEASE - 10000 10000 10000 21000 21000 20000 20000 24000 28000 
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TABLE A.11 - VESSELS VALUE (FIXED ASSETS) (INPUT) 
COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - - - 884000 1019000 1211000 1453200 1540000 1641635 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS - 525199 641607 703707 707339 1073986 959550 1176819 1186711 1333657 
DHT HOLDINGS 322577 398005 462387 441036 412744 454542 310023 263142 988168 986597 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 752702 740631 707853 825449 988263 1022793 964855 911429 909992 962685 
SCORPIO TANKERS - - - 99954 333425 322457 395412 530270 1971878 3087753 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 1649928 2127704 2209317 2059720 2316947 2231996 2207842 2231589 2388108 2424524 
FRONTLINE LTD 2446278 2324789 2100717 1740666 1427526 1334512 1175000 995000 1455000 1028000 
TEEKAY TANKERS 282451 267729 522796 506309 757437 716567 885992 859308 897237 1767925 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - - - 2919.1 3289.5 3063.4 2914.8 3129.7 3809 
TORM 1136408 2270064 2235863 2390391 2560079 2258550 1955664 1697423 536869 1578824 
FIRST SHIP LEASE - 609806 905604 845187 775023 784696 727517 630968 556019 526516 
 
TABLE A.12 - GROSS PROFIT (OPERATING) (OUTPUT) 
COMPANY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NAVIOS MARITIME - - - - 23268 57062 69220 122005 153088 198247 
CAPITAL PRODUCT PARTNERS - 47177 89585 63931 40288 35298 3246 41323 60711 73806 
DHT HOLDINGS 48799 40958 92480 41192 23199 -33554 -89504 1007 27408 135843 
NORDIC AMERICAN TANKERS 72242 53245 121288 2418 781 -71213 -67902 93608 194655 286749 
SCORPIO TANKERS - - - 4221 1160 -75599 -17175 17792 71007 307084 
TSAKOS ENERGY NAVIGATION 205246 249702 278838 72675 80695 -37697 1290 4893 76048 188080 
FRONTLINE LTD 590955.9 401023 708187 237049 276977 -39374 -15851 -123992 -73220 178295 
TEEKAY TANKERS 57152 48959 90683 88009 35374 101169 -340195 13339 62058 187200 
CONCORDIA MARITIME - - - - 100.2 107.6 78.4 0.8 57 210 
TORM -147335 183765 537594 242251 179766 81034 92782 150357 48411 235868 
FIRST SHIP LEASE - 9390 24117 30997 19964 3404 19280 -40628 16797 23348 
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